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Change to survive:
a Moving Target Defense approach to secure resource-constrained
distributed devices
by Alessandra De Benedictis
This doctoral thesis has been developed with the aim of defining a design methodology
for monitoring architectures composed of resource-constrained devices (sensor nodes,
FPGAs, smartphones...), able to take into account both functional and non-functional
requirements. Even if our primary focus was on security, our activity was aimed at
identifying a holistic approach able to meet even other quality requirements, such as
performance and energy consumption, as they are fundamental in real world applica-
tions.
Security, performance and energy consumption requirements are closely related to one
another and are often conflicting, and typically in complex real-world scenarios they
change over time, thus requiring the ability to adapt dynamically. These features make
the definition of a comprehensive approach very challenging in constrained networks, and
require the introduction of a more flexible strategy to achieve security while preserving
the overall quality of the system.
In order to cope with these issues, we proposed a reconfiguration approach based on
the Moving Target Defense paradigm, an emergent technique aimed at continuously
changing a system’s attack surface for thwarting attacks. Such mechanisms increase the
uncertainty, complexity, and cost for attackers, limit the exposure of vulnerabilities, and
ultimately increase overall resiliency, with the result of decreasing the attack probability.
We defined a reconfiguration model for a generic embedded node, identifying some of the
possible reconfigurable parameters – namely the firmware, the APIs and the cryptosys-
tem adopted to secure exchanged data – and characterized a reconfiguration strategy,
aimed at choosing the new configuration to activate based on given requirements. In
order to do that, we introduced a coverage-based security metric to quantitatively mea-
sure the level of security provided by each system configuration; such metric, along
with the commonly adopted performance metrics, is used by the reconfiguration strat-
egy to identify the configuration to activate in the system that best meets the current
requirements.
In order to show the feasibility of our approach in real applications, we considered
a Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) case study. We defined a reconfiguration model
characterized by two different cryptosystems, based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC), at the security layer, and two different firmware versions at the physical layer. We
developed and implemented two ad-hoc reconfiguration mechanisms to perform security-
level and physical-level reconfiguration, and conducted specific analyses on the security
layer to show how reconfiguration can help increase, or at least control, the security level
provided by a system.
At this aim, we first analyzed the performance, consumption and intrinsic security level
provided by the two considered cryptosystems, and then conducted theoretical and ex-
perimental evaluations to show that reconfiguration is effective in increasing the com-
plexity for the attacker.
Current MTD designs lack quantitative metrics to measure the effectiveness of the pro-
posed mechanisms in terms of enhanced security. We adopted the attack probability to
indirectly measure the level of security provided by each configuration and show that
our approach is capable of reducing the probability of successful attacks, compared to a
baseline scenario where configurations are static.
Keywords: Moving Target Defense, Wireless Sensor Networks, Reconfiguration, Secu-
rity Metrics.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The research activity conducted during my Ph.D. program had the main goal of
defining a design methodology for monitoring architectures composed of resource-
constrained devices (sensor nodes, FPGAs, smartphones...), able to take into ac-
count both functional and non-functional requirements. Even if our primary focus
was on security, our activity was aimed at identifying a holistic approach able to
meet even other quality requirements, such as performance and energy consump-
tion, as they are fundamental in real world applications.
The methodological approach adopted to achieve this goal encompasses two as-
pects: (i) introduction of a mechanism to quantitatively evaluate the overall quality
of a system, defined in terms of security, performance and energy consumption,
and (ii) implementation of proper strategies aimed at controlling the quality of a
system during its operation.
Security, performance and energy consumption requirements are closely related
to one another and are often conflicting: security protocols for example have an
impact on the number and the size of exchanged messages and on the elaboration
time, computational load and packet flow negatively impact on nodes lifetime and
performance and, in turn, nodes lifetime affects failure rate. The design activity
typically aims at fulfilling a subset of these requirements, sacrificing the others, to
get feasible solutions in real applications: often, due to the HW/SW limitations
of the considered devices, security must be sacrificed to performance.
1
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Moreover, in complex real-world scenarios, security and performance requirements
may change over time, thus requiring the ability to adapt dynamically: a specific
solution adopted at deployment time may result no more adequate later, due
for example to uncovered malicious activities detection, or to performance decay
caused by battery exhaustion.
Finally, it must be considered that security degrades over time: each security so-
lution is designed to cope with a specific set of attacks and provides an intrinsic
level of security, depending on the cryptographic scheme, the algorithm, the length
of the keys, etc.. After deployment, the probability of having a successful attack
increases, as the system’s attack surface, defined as “the subset of the system’s
resources (methods, channels, and data) that can be potentially used by an at-
tacker to launch an attack” [1], is exposed to attackers. The longer a systems
attack surface is exposed to attackers, the greater is the attackers’ opportunity to
gain knowledge about the system, its topology and vulnerabilities, to complete an
attack.
In order to be able to cope with the above discussed issues, a more flexible way to
achieve security, inspired by the Moving Target Defense (MTD) paradigm [2–4],
can be devised. MTD is based on continuously changing a system’s attack surface
in order to increase the attacker’s uncertainty about it, and limit the exposure
of vulnerabilities and opportunity for attack. An intuitive means to implement
MTD is reconfiguration, that could be performed both at a physical level, that is by
actually changing some system parameters (firmware, implemented cryptosystem,
message format, etc.), and at a virtual level, that is by adopting mechanisms to
give the attackers a virtual view of the system that does not correspond to the
real one.
We introduced a MTD approach based on fine-grained physical reconfiguration,
that takes into account the specific security and performance requirements depend-
ing on the deployment scenario while having in mind the HW and SW constraints
of the nodes. We defined a reconfiguration model, identifying the reconfigurable
parameters of a system, and characterized a reconfiguration strategy, aimed at
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choosing the new configuration to activate, given input requirements. Finally, we
devised different reconfiguration mechanisms for a WSN case study to practically
execute the reconfiguration operation.
As the main goal of reconfiguration is to increase the overall quality of a sys-
tem, proper metrics must be defined to measure the level of security provided by
each configuration, as well as the overall performance and the energy consump-
tion profile, in order to be able to compare different configurations and choose
the most appropriate one to meet the given requirements. While several metrics
exist and are commonly adopted to measure a system’s performance and power
consumption, providing a quantitative measure of the level of security of a system
is not straightforward: some security metrics have been proposed in the litera-
ture, mostly based on the analysis of attack graphs or on risk quantification, but
they are generally hard to link to the adopted definition of configuration, that
is centered on the mechanisms that are available to enforce a subset of security
requirements.
We adopted a different metric, based on the coverage of a set of known attacks:
once the admissible configurations and the attacks of interest have been identified,
it is possible to build an Attack Coverage Table, that helps define the level of
security provided by each configuration, by identifying the degree of coverage of
each configuration with respect to specific attacks, or equivalently with respect
to specific requirements. As said, security metric should be combined with other
metrics dealing with energy consumption, response time or memory occupancy, to
give an overall score to each configuration. The resulting score can be used by the
reconfiguration scheduler to choose the new configuration to implement in order
to meet the given requirements.
Even though all networks composed of limited computational, storage and power
resources share the same issues, the analysis we conducted has been focused on
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), that are widely adopted in critical scenarios
and present several security issues to be addressed by means of proper security
policies and mechanisms.
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Different security mechanisms have been implemented to secure WSNs, primarily
based on symmetric key cryptography and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)[5],
designed in order to limit power consumption and the computational/storage ef-
fort. We analyzed some of the most recent solutions proposed in the literature to
protect data exchanged among sensor nodes, and selected two available libraries,
namely WMECC [6] and TinyPairing[7], both based on ECC, providing different
levels of security and having different resource utilization profiles.
We adopted the two libraries to build a cryptosystem used to secure a monitoring
application and conducted specific analyses aimed at:
• measuring and comparing performance and power consumption of the two
different cryptosystems,
• defining the intrinsic level of security provided by each cryptosystem, based
on the security requirements they are able to ensure (static security analysis),
• showing how reconfiguration can help decrease the probability of attack for
a brute force attack case.
We designed two reconfiguration mechanisms for WSN, respectively able to recon-
figure the cryptosystem adopted to secure the communication, and the firmware
installed on sensor nodes. The theoretical and experimental analyses that we con-
ducted showed that, by periodically reconfiguring the nodes, the proposed mecha-
nisms are effective in increasing the complexity for the attacker and, consequently,
in decreasing the probability of completing a successful attack when the reconfig-
uration frequency is properly chosen.
Although many interesting activities have been conducted with respect to the
above discussed topics, several issues are still open and need to be investigated.
Our future plans include the design of a fully-automated reconfiguration strat-
egy capable of identifying the system configuration that can best meet specific,
dynamically changing requirements in terms of security, performance and power
consumption. In order to do this, an innovative security metric for the compari-
son of different configurations must be defined; the most challenging aspect is the
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identification and modeling of the dependency relations existing between security
and time, that constitutes a relevant and still unexplored topic. We also plan to
perform a deep evaluation of the optimal reconfiguration frequency and to intro-
duce automatic mechanisms to map the existing requirements onto the available
configurations (technological mapping).
This thesis work is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 describes the MTD approach adopted to control the level of security of a
monitoring architecture composed of resource-constrained devices. We define a re-
configuration model for embedded systems, characterize a reconfiguration strategy
and discuss about mechanisms to enforce the new configuration. In this chapter
we also discuss about the dependency of security on time, and show how reconfig-
uration can help increase, or at least control, not only the security level provided
by a system, but also its performance and consumption. In order to measure the
level of security provided by each configuration, we introduce a coverage-based se-
curity metric, relying upon an Attack Coverage Matrix, that identifies the attacks
covered by each available configuration.
Chapter 3 addresses the main security issues arising in networks composed of
resource-constrained devices, focusing on the WSN case study. An overview of
WSNs is given: the peculiar HW/SW features of sensor nodes are described,
highlighting the main consequent challenges for security and performance, and
the most common attacks against WSNs are presented, along with some of the
most relevant security solutions proposed in the literature.
Chapter 4 describes the experimental setup: an overview is given of the WM-ECC
and TinyPairing libraries, selected among the most recent solutions based on ECC
to build a cryptosystem on top of a reference monitoring application. The chapter
presents and discusses the analysis conducted on performance, consumption and
intrinsic security of these two cryptosystems.
Chapter 5 shows the theoretical and experimental analysis conducted to prove that
the proposed reconfiguration mechanisms are effective in increasing the complexity
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for the attacker and, consequently, in decreasing the probability of completing a
successful attack.
Finally, some concluding remarks and future directions are given in Chapter 6.
Chapter 2
An MTD approach to secure
resource-constrained distributed
devices
In this chapter, we describe the MTD approach adopted to control the level of se-
curity of a monitoring architecture composed of resource-constrained devices. We
define a reconfiguration model for embedded systems, characterize a reconfiguration
strategy and discuss about mechanisms to enforce the new configuration. We dis-
cuss about the dependency of security on time, and show how reconfiguration can
help increase, or at least control, not only the security level provided by a system,
but also its performance and consumption. We also introduce a coverage-based se-
curity metric, relying upon an Attack Coverage Matrix, that identifies the attacks
covered by each available configuration.
2.1 Moving Target Defense
In recent years, we have witnessed a growing interest in techniques aimed at con-
tinuously changing a system’s attack surface in order to prevent or thwart attacks.
This approach to cyber defense is generally referred to as Moving Target Defense
(MTD)[3, 4], and it is currently considered one of the game-changing themes in
7
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cyber security by the Executive Office of the President, National Science and Tech-
nology Council. As stated in [2], Moving Target Defense “enables us to create,
analyze, evaluate, and deploy mechanisms and strategies that are diverse and that
continually shift and change over time to increase complexity and cost for attack-
ers, limit the exposure of vulnerabilities and opportunities for attack, and increase
system resiliency”.
MTD provides a way to make it more difficult for an attacker to exploit a vulner-
able system. The idea is to change one or more properties of a system in order
to present attackers with a varying attack surface, so that, by the time the at-
tacker has gained enough information about the system for planning an attack,
the system’s attack surface will be different enough to disrupt it. According to
the definition of [1], “A system’s attack surface is the subset of the system’s re-
sources (methods, channels, and data) that can be potentially used by an attacker
to launch an attack”. It depends on the system’s HW and SW features, and can
be changed by dynamically reconfiguring such characteristics, working at different
levels of granularity.
As suggested by [8], MTD approaches (also referred to as diversity techniques)
may be applied both at a low level (e.g. working on code location in memory) and
at the application level. The advantage of applying low-level diversity is that it
does not require the understanding of the application’s behavior and can be done
automatically, but it is only capable of thwarting specific classes of attacks, such
as code injection and memory corruption attacks.
Several low level MTD techniques have been proposed in the literature, based
on the idea of automatically generating diverse variants of a program to disrupt
exploits (diversity in program execution), first introduced in [9].
A widely deployed example is Address Space Randomization, that was introduced
in 2000 by the PAX Team for Linux [10], and has been implemented in most
modern operating systems. The basic idea is to randomize the locations of objects
in memory so that an attack depending on the knowledge about the address of
these objects will fail.
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Instruction Set Randomization [11] is another technique for obfuscating the lan-
guage understood by a system to protect against code-injection attacks: by ran-
domizing the underlying systems instructions, foreign code introduced by an attack
would fail to execute correctly, regardless of the injection approach.
Another type of low-level diversification is altering how data is stored in memory:
in [12] authors present Data Randomization, a technique that provides probabilis-
tic protection against attacks that exploits memory errors by XOR-ing data with
random masks. Data randomization uses static analysis to partition instruction
operands into equivalence classes: it places two operands in the same class if they
may refer to the same object in an execution that does not violate memory safety.
Then it assigns a random mask to each class and it generates code instrumented
to XOR data read from or written to memory with the mask of the memory
operands class. Therefore, attacks that violate the results of the static analysis
have unpredictable results.
Jackson et al. present in [13] a diversity technique based on the generation, during
the compilation phase, of multiple functionally equivalent machine codes for the
same high-level source: with massive-scale software diversity, every user could get
its own diversified program version, so that it is impossible for attackers to run a
successful attack.
Looking at higher-level MTD techniques, several approaches have been proposed,
aimed at thwarting the reconnaissance effort of attackers: reconnaissance enables
an adversary to gather information about network topology, network dynamics,
and even critical system and service information of the target system. This infor-
mation can be used to identify system vulnerabilities, and to design and execute
specific exploits on the system or services.
In this regard, several approaches for dynamically changing nodes IP addresses for
proactive security have been proposed in the literature. In 2001 Kewley et al. [14]
presented a technique called DYNAT (Dynamic Network Address Translation),
aimed at confusing any adversary sniffing the network by obfuscating host iden-
tity information in TCP/IP packet headers when packets enter public parts of the
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network. Whenever a client host wants to communicate with a protected server
host, the addressing information contained in the header of its request packets is
translated (encrypted) by a DYNAT shim before routing the packet to the server.
A server gateway receives the packets, reverses the translation in the header fields
(decryption) and obtains the true host identity information, used to pass the pack-
ets to the target server. Both the client and the server gateway must share a secret
seed value, that is used to encrypt the identity information at sender side and de-
crypt them at the recipient. They are synchronized to periodically change the
secret, and thus change the translation results, making it difficult for the adver-
sary to create and maintain a map of the network. Although this technique has
the advantage of providing a transparent approach to protect node identities from
sniffing, it has been designed to protect a set of static nodes deployed behind a
centralized gateway, that represents an interface between the protected network
and the external world and performs the translation of addressing information
for all incoming and outgoing packets. When considering more complex scenar-
ios, characterized by highly dynamic network configurations, this approach would
not work as it might be impossible to manage all communications through the
centralized gateway and achieve node synchronization.
Another work funded by DARPA is presented in [15] by Atighetchi et al., that
give an overview of current set of network-level defenses in the DARPA APOD
(Application That Participate in Their Own Defense) project. Among the pro-
posed network-centric defense mechanisms, the APOD toolkit also provides a port
and address hopping mechanism, based on constantly changing a service’s TCP
identity to both hide the service’s real identity and confuse the attacker during
reconnaissance. Packets intercepted by attackers will reveal random addresses,
which are valid only for a small period of time, e.g., 1 minute. For a port attack to
be successful, the attacker must discover the current ports and execute the attack
all within one refresh cycle. Similarly to the previous described approach, the
hopping mechanism is implemented by a client component, directly located on the
client machine, that intercepts higher level calls to the real server, and replaces all
(realaddress:realport) header information with (fakeaddress:fakeport). The NAT
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gateway is located either on the servers LAN or directly on the server host and per-
forms the reverse mapping from (fakeaddress:fakeport) to (realaddress:realport).
Even if this approach provides better unpredictability of identities than DYNAT,
it also requires synchronization among the two communicating components, and
the same considerations previously made apply in this case.
Antonatos et al. [16] introduce a proactive defense mechanism called Network
Address Space Randomization (NASR) whose objective is to harden networks
against worms that use precomputed hitlists of vulnerable targets, by forcing nodes
to frequently change their IP addresses. In order to achieve this goal, the authors
implemented an advanced NASR-enabled DHCP server to expire DHCP leases
at intervals suitable for effective randomization. As the addresses are actually
changed at the end-points of a communication, active connections are disrupted
during the update; moreover, NASR is limited in the address space as it uses LAN
addresses, and requires changes to the end-host operating system, thus making
the deployment costly.
In [17] the authors introduce an MTD technique called OpenFlow Random Host
Mutation (OF-RHM): each host is assigned an address range, selected from the
entire unused address space in the network, and at each mutation interval, a
virtual IP is chosen from this range and associated with the host. A Software-
Defined Networking (SDN) approach is adopted for range allocation and mutation
coordination: a centralized controller (NOX) properly installs flows in OpenFlow
switches to forward requests and perform the address translation actions.
If considering some of the most adopted security solutions for networked systems,
a common MTD practice consists in updating the cryptographic keys used for en-
cryption of communication channels; this introduces some uncertainty for attackers
but presents the problem of key distribution, that is a critical phase particularly
subject to attacks.
As shown in details in the following section, in this thesis we propose an MTD-
inspired framework, based on reconfiguration at different levels, with the reconfig-
uration granularity chosen at runtime based on current requirements. We focus
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on physical reconfiguration, consisting in actually changing some of the system’s
parameters; by the way, virtual reconfiguration strategies aimed at presenting at-
tackers with a virtual view of the system (about nodes ID, topology, traffic pattern)
can be devised, and easily plugged into our framework.
2.2 The proposed MTD approach
As anticipated, an intuitive means to implement MTD is reconfiguration, that
could be performed both at a physical level, that is by actually changing some
system parameters (firmware, implemented cryptosystem, message format, etc.),
and at a virtual level, that is by adopting mechanisms to give the attackers a
virtual view of the system that does not correspond to the real one. We intro-
duced an MTD strategy based on fine-grained physical reconfiguration, that takes
into account the specific security and performance requirements depending on the
deployment scenario while having in mind the HW and SW features of the nodes.
By reconfiguring a system, it is possible to increase the overall level of security
provided by the system, both pro-actively, by periodically switching to a new
configuration to reduce the time each system configuration is exposed to malicious
observers, and re-actively, by scheduling a new configuration either after some
detection event (e.g. in order to cope with specific attack typologies), or to meet
new security requirements. Moreover, reconfiguration should take into account
the current resource consumption and elaboration time, evaluating if and how this
negatively affects the security level.
A reconfiguration approach can be formalized by defining the following items:
• Reconfiguration Model: identification of the system’s reconfigurable pa-
rameters and of the admissible configurations;
• Reconfiguration Strategies: scheduling of the new reconfiguration based
on the security and performance requirements;
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• Reconfiguration Mechanisms: enforcement of the new configuration,
through proper mechanisms.
In order to refer our examples to specific physical parameters for reconfiguration
and specific mechanisms, in our discussion we will explicitly refer to a network of
embedded nodes (e.g. WSNs, Smartphones, FPGA). Embedded nodes are systems
designed to perform specific functions, that can be interconnected in order to
achieve greater system design flexibility, improve diagnosability, and reduce wiring
cost. In the following subsections, we present a reconfiguration model for a generic
embedded node, and discuss about the level of security provided by a configuration
and its dependency on time.
2.2.1 The reference reconfiguration model
An embedded node could be considered as structured into several architectural
layers, as shown in Figure2.1.
Figure 2.1: A layered view of an embedded node
Among them, we identified three main reconfigurable layers:
• Security layer. Application security in an embedded network can be achieved
by implementing a proper cryptosystem to secure data exchanged among
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nodes; security-level reconfiguration could be performed by switching among
different cryptosystems, that satisfy specific security requirements while meet-
ing certain performance and energy consumption constraints.
• Application layer. In order to perform complex tasks, embedded nodes com-
municate with one another according to specific application interfaces (APIs),
defining the format of the exchanged messages and the communication pro-
tocols. Reconfiguration could be applied at this level by providing different
APIs for the same application.
• Physical layer. In embedded systems, the software is embedded in the node
firmware, that is typically preloaded on internal read-only memory (ROM)
chip, in contrast to a general-purpose computer that loads its programs into
random access memory (RAM) at run-time. Firmware provides the con-
trol program of the device and represents the skeleton where the different
libraries for the implementation of the available cryptosystems and APIs
can be plugged and activated via proper software switches. Nodes could be
equipped with several versions of the firmware in order to perform physical
reconfiguration when needed.
Clearly, further parameters could be considered for reconfiguration, such as the
hardware configuration or the topology, as long as their reconfiguration is feasible
from a technical and energy consumption point of view. Hardware reconfiguration
is expensive and not feasible on most of the available devices but needed in case of
damage. Network topology could be reconfigured in terms of the view offered to
external observers; this could be achieved by implementing a mechanism that, for
instance, presents virtual identities or introduces additional fake nodes into the
network. Such a mechanism would need additional protocols and algorithms that
are often too expensive for the considered nodes.
Consider an embedded network composed of N nodes. Let IM be the set of
firmware versions available, API be the set of possible application interfaces, and
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SEC be the set of available security mechanisms. The set of possible node con-
figurations is defined as:
Cnode = IM × API × SEC (2.1)
The set of possible network configurations is then defined as a subset of the N -ary
Cartesian power of the set Cnode.
Cnet ⊆ Cnode × Cnode · · · × Cnode = CNnode (2.2)
The choice of the reconfiguration level impacts both the system performance and
the provided level of security. From the performance point of view, changing the
firmware of the whole network or of a subset of it, is much more expensive, in
terms of latency and power consumption, than changing the APIs or the cryp-
tosystem, whose reconfiguration could be handled in software. On the other side,
by changing the entire application running on a node, it becomes harder for an
attacker to exploit software vulnerabilities in order to gain complete control of the
node. Similarly, APIs’ reconfiguration could be useful to confuse an attacker that
is observing the communication protocol in order to find an exploit to disturb or
control the communication.
At the security layer, the cryptosystem itself is designed to cope with a specific
set of attacks and provides an intrinsic level of security, depending on the cryp-
tographic scheme, the algorithm, the length of the keys, etc. Cryptosystem’s
reconfiguration can increase the level of security in two ways, that is:
• by switching to a cryptosystem that has itself a higher intrinsic level of
security, absolutely or with respect to a specific set of attacks (that have
been currently detected for example, and were not covered by the previous
configuration), or
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• by selecting an equivalent cryptosystem that uses different parameters – e.g.
by updating the cryptographic key while keeping the same cryptographic
algorithm.
Given a certain configuration, the more an attacker is able to observe, the more
she will be able to infer about the system; by continuously changing the system
configuration, the attacker will be presented with different view of the system over
time, and will have to start from scratch many times to find an exploit.
While the choice of the firmware does not influence the way nodes communicate,
cryptosystem and APIs reconfiguration has a direct impact on the format of ex-
changed packets and communication protocols. For this reason, some combinations
of node configurations may not be valid as they would interfere with normal net-
work operation. In order to preserve communication, a proper mechanism must be
designed to ensure consistency among legitimate nodes through reconfigurations.
Once the reconfiguration model has been defined, it is possible to design a recon-
figuration strategy able to select the reconfiguration granularity and the specific
configuration to activate depending on given quality requirements. In the follow-
ing sections we discuss about security level evaluation and security metrics, that
constitute the fundamental parameter considered by the reconfiguration strategy.
2.2.2 Security Level Evaluation
In this section, we will formalize the notion of level of security associated with a
node/network configuration, and will show its dependency on time. Based on the
analysis of security and efficiency requirements, we will later define the reconfig-
uration function, aimed at preserving or increasing the level of security provided
by a node or a network.
The security of complex systems depends on many technical and organizational
issues that must be properly addressed. The need for a clear definition and se-
lection of security rules has led system administrators to set up security policies
trying to adopt formal approaches to describe system security configurations. In
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spite of the ambiguity of such policies, a common approach to evaluate a system’s
security is through evaluation of its security policy. At present, such an evalua-
tion is performed by hand whenever enterprises endeavor to extend their trusted
domain and cooperate [18].
This approach also includes the well known standards as Common Criteria and
TCSEC [19, 20], that are very suitable to assess and audit the security level pro-
vided by a company, by a specific procedure or, in general, by a system. The
Common Criteria (CC) for Information Technology Security Evaluation (Common
Criteria or CC) [19] are an internationally approved set of standard for computer
security certification. They are used by Government customers in the USA and
the NATO community along with other organizations, particularly in the pub-
lic sector, to determine the level of security and assurance of various technology
products. However, the assurance levels provided by CC (from EAL1 to EAL7)
do not measure the security of the system itself, but simply state at what level
the system was tested, and do not find a direct application in our approach.
Defining a quantitative measure of the level of security provided by a system is a
complex task. Several security metrics have been proposed in literature, mostly
based on the analysis of attack graphs or on risk quantification.
In [21], the authors present a stochastic model for quantifying security of networked
systems. A vulnerability graph is used to abstract a networked system: a vertex
may represent a vulnerability or a system with possibly multiple vulnerabilities,
and an edge captures the relation that the exploitation of one vulnerability could
lead to the exploitation of the other. A stochastic process (specifically, a renewal
process) is used to model the evolution of a randomly picked vertex: each cycle of
the renewal process is composed of the time interval corresponding to the secure
state, and the time interval corresponding to the compromised state. The security
metric used is ”‘the probability that a randomly picked vertex is compromised
when the system enters its steady state”’; the authors aim to capture the impact
of the state of the neighbors of a node on its own state, because a node may get
compromised through an attack that is launched from one or multiple neighbors.
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Barth et al. in [22] study the efficacy of security reactive strategies, considering
a game-theoretic model with a strategic attacker who responds to the defenders
strategy. They make worst case assumptions about the attacker (she holds com-
plete knowledge of the defenders strategy and is not required to act rationally),
and assume that the defender can observe the attackers past actions. Authors
evaluate the defenders strategy by measuring the attackers cumulative return-on-
investment, the return-on-attack (ROA). The focus is on defenders who seek to
reduce the attackers incentives for attacking the enterprise. Authors compare the
payoff the attacker receives from her attack with the cost of performing it.
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)[23] is a widely used and well-
established standard for classifying the severity of security vulnerabilities. It
provides a universal open and standardized method for rating IT vulnerabilities:
CVSS consists of 3 groups of metrics: Base, Temporal and Environmental. Each
group produces a numeric score ranging from 0 to 10, and a Vector, a compressed
textual representation that reflects the values used to derive the score. The Base
group represents the intrinsic qualities of a vulnerability. The Temporal group
reflects the characteristics of a vulnerability that change over time. The Environ-
mental group represents the characteristics of a vulnerability that are unique to
any user’s environment. A final score is computed by combining the score of each
group. Generally, the base and temporal metrics are specified by vulnerability
bulletin analysts, security product vendors, or application vendors because they
typically have better information about the characteristics of a vulnerability than
do users. The environmental metrics, however, are specified by users because they
are best able to assess the potential impact of a vulnerability within their own
environments.
In [24] Ahmed et al. propose a novel security metric framework that identifies
and quantifies objectively the most significant security risk factors, which include
existing vulnerabilities, historical trend of vulnerability of the remotely accessible
services, prediction of potential vulnerabilities for any general network service and
their estimated severity and finally policy resistance to attack propagation within
the network. Security is measured based on two critical risk aspects - the risk of
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having a successful attack and the risk of this attack being propagated within the
network.
Finally, Jajodia et al. present in [25] a novel quantitative metric for the security
of computer networks that is based on an analysis of attack graphs. The metric
measures the security strength of a network in terms of the strength of the weakest
adversary who can successfully penetrate the network. They present an algorithm
that computes the minimal sets of required initial attributes for the weakest ad-
versary to possess in order to successfully compromise a network, given a specific
network configuration, set of known exploits, a specific goal state, and an attacker
class.
All the above metrics are generally hard to link to the adopted definition of config-
uration, that is centered on the mechanisms that are available to enforce a subset
of security requirements. For this reason, we adopt a different metric, based on
the coverage of a set of known attacks.
An attack could have several objectives, such as physically taking possession of
a node, interfering with communication at the physical level, exploiting software
vulnerabilities to take control of a node, disturb network operation at routing/ap-
plication level or intercept sensitive data. In this discussion we are interested
in attacks aimed at interfering, steering or eavesdropping communications at the
application layer among nodes, and at exploiting vulnerabilities of the firmware
installed on nodes.
Let Threats define the set of threats of interest, belonging to the above discussed
set of attacks. A configuration c is said to cover a threat t ∈ Threats, if either the
cryptosystem implemented at the security layer or the specific firmware version
running on the node include mechanisms to protect the node from such threat.
Once the admissible configurations and the attacks of interest have been identi-
fied, it is possible to build an Attack Coverage Table, that helps define the levels
of security provided by each configuration [26]. Table 2.1 shows an example of at-
tack coverage table relative to configurations {c1, c2, c3, c4}, under the hypothesis
that three attacks of interest have been identified, namely AttackA, AttackB and
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Conf Attack A Attack B Attack C SL
c1 × L1
c2 × × L2
c3 × × × L3
c4 × × L2
Table 2.1: An example of Attacks Coverage Table
AttackC. An increasing level of security (from L1 to L4 in the example) can be
assigned to configurations, based on the risk associated with the attacks and their
coverage properties.
Coverage can be defined either as a ON/OFF property (that is an attack is covered
or uncovered), or in terms of the degree of satisfaction of specific requirements
(e.g. authentication, integrity, confidentiality, key distribution...), using a scoring
system (similar to CVSS for vulnerabilities).
The level of security associated with a configuration could simply depend on the
number of covered threats, or it could be set depending on the risk associated
with each threat, either in a static way (the risk associated with a threat is set
at deployment and remains unchanged for the entire operation of the network) or
dynamically (the risk associated with a threat changes dynamically during network
operation depending on current conditions and possible detection events).
2.2.3 Security level dependency on time
As already said, the level of security provided by a configuration depends on
the implemented cryptosystem (cryptographic scheme, algorithms and keys) at
the security layer and the installed firmware version at the physical layer, and is
characterized by an intrinsic value that quantifies the effort needed by an attacker
to break it. Indeed, the more a system configuration is exposed to malicious
observers, the more the actual level of security decreases; for this reason, the
security level is a monotonically decreasing function of time, having its maximum
in the intrinsic value associated with the particular configuration.
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Figure 2.2: Level of security through reconfigurations
As graphically illustrated in Figure 2.2, thanks to reconfiguration, it is possible
to avoid that the level of security goes below a certain threshold, and periodically
re-start from the intrinsic value associated with the new configuration. Dually,
thanks to reconfiguration, we avoid that the probability of successfully completing
an attack increases. In fact, such probability depends on the considered type
of attack and is represented by an increasing function: the longer an attacker
can try to exploit a system, the higher the probability of success. Clearly, if
the attacker has unlimited time, eventually she will be able to break the system.
By introducing reconfiguration, as we will theoretically prove in section 5.3, the
probability of performing a successful attack is decreased, as the attacker’s effort
is nullified each time a new configuration is activated.
In the following, we will refer to the level of security as a security metric to
express how secure a configuration is with respect to the considered attacks. A
security value can be assigned, based on the attacks coverage table, both to a
single node and to a link, defined as a connection between communicating nodes.
Node security is related primarily to the physical layer (e.g., tamper resistant HW,
protected external ROM), while subnet security depends on the security layer (e.g.,
cryptographic algorithm, key length, key agreement mechanisms); as previously
discussed, both also depend on the reconfiguration mechanism itself, that is on
time.
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Assume that the set of available cryptosystems is a totally ordered set: given
s1,s2 ∈ SEC, there is an ordering relation between them, and s1 ≤ s2 means that
the cryptosystem s1 is not more secure than the cryptosystem s2. It is possible to
have elements in SEC that are equivalent from the security point of view, adopting
for instance the same algorithm but using different parameters (e.g. different keys).
Assume the sequence of the M configurations adopted by a node n is given
by 〈C1(n), . . . , CM(n)〉, and the sequence of time instants in which such con-
figuration were activated is 〈T1(n), . . . , TM(n)〉. Let the configurations Ci(p) =
(imi(p), apii(p), si(p)) and Ci(q) = (imi(q), apii(q), si(q)) be the i-th active con-
figurations respectively on node p and q. Note that in order for the nodes to be
able to communicate, they should either share the same security and API config-
urations, or they should be provided with a mechanism to always know what is
the configuration currently used by other legitimate nodes. Let Ti(p, q) identify
the initial time instant when the status of p and q is such that they are able to
communicate.
In the following, we will refer to a link as a directed edge (p, q) connecting two
nodes involved in a communication, with packets traveling from p to q. A link
configuration is defined as Ci(p, q) = (Ci(p), Ci(q)).
Let us refer to SL(p,q)(t) as the level of security, at time t, of a link (p, q). It is the
level of security associated with the cryptosystem used to secure data flow from p
to q, denoted with si(p, q). With SLp(t) we identify the level of security of node
p, depending on its physical configuration imi(p) and on time.
Definition 2.1 (Level of security of a link). According to the previous consider-
ations, the level of security SL(p,q)(t) of a link (p, q), provided by Ci(p, q) at time
t ∈ [Ti(p, q);Ti+1(p, q)], can be expressed as a function of the specific cryptosystem
adopted si(p, q) and the time elapsed since the current configuration was activated.
SL(p,q)(t) = f(si(p, q), t− Ti(p, q)) (2.3)
Definition 2.2 (Level of security of a node). Similarly, the level of security SLp(t)
of a node p can be expressed as a function of the specific firmware adopted imi(p)
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and the time elapsed since the current physical configuration was activated.
SLp(t) = f(imi(p), t− Ti(p)) (2.4)
Definition 2.3 (Level of security of the network). Assuming that the network is
partitioned in different subnets, each composed of nodes communicating with one
another with a certain interface (security and application layer), the overall level
of security of the network depends both on the security of nodes composing the
network, and of the different subnets, other than on time.
SLnet(t) = A ·
N−1∑
i=0
N−1∑
j=0,j 6=i
αij · SL(i,j)(t) · xij +B ·
N−1∑
i=0
βi · SLi(t) (2.5)
A and B respectively represent the relative importance of the set of links and the
set of network nodes respectively, and satisfy the following constraint: A+B = 1.
The αij represent link weights, while βi are node weights and are useful to give
more importance to critical nodes or portions of the network. They are subject to
the following constraints:
∑N−1
i=0
∑N−1
j=0,j 6=i αij = 1 and
∑N−1
i=0 βi = 1 (2.6)
The xij variables represent the existence of links and are defined as follows.
xij =
 1 if i 6= j and ∃ a link between node i and j0 if i 6= j and @ a link between node i and j
 (2.7)
2.2.4 Reconfiguration Strategies
Once the notion of level of security associated with a configuration has been for-
malized, it is possible to define the reconfiguration strategy, that depends not only
on specific security requirements, but also on additional performance parameters.
An MTD approach to secure resource-constrained distributed devices 24
The selection of the new configuration to activate is performed by a security driven
scheduler. The scheduler can be either a centralized entity making decisions on
the global network configuration, or a decentralized component, independently
deployed on each network node, making local reconfiguration decisions.
In a centralized approach, a central entity triggers a configuration update based
on some events – e.g., timer expiration, detected security threat – and transmits
its decision to all nodes involved in communication.
In a de-centralized approach, each node is able to schedule, independently from
other nodes, when to update its own configuration. Communication among legiti-
mate nodes is preserved adopting additional mechanisms; we will give some details
about a possible reconfiguration protocol in the following chapters.
A local or global reconfiguration task can be triggered either periodically or after
the detection of an attack. In the second case, the detection of an ongoing attack
could create new security requirements, thus influencing the selection of the new
configuration. Second, each reconfiguration task is associated with a cost, rep-
resenting the effort needed to switch to the new configuration, in terms of both
energy consumption and delays introduced into network operation.
The current battery level is a fundamental parameter to decide about the new con-
figuration: for example, if the node battery is low, a reconfiguration may not be
possible in practice. Let Battery = {lo,med, hi} be the set of possible battery lev-
els of a node. As for performance, the distributed application running on the net-
work may have specific requirements with respect to the delays that can be toler-
ated when switching among different configurations. Delay = {restart tolerated,
restart not tolerated} is an example of the delay allowance levels.
The node reconfiguration function can be denoted as:
node reconf : Cnode × L× L×Battery ×Delay × Threats→ Cnode (2.8)
where the input arguments are respectively: the current configuration ccurr(i) ∈
Cnode, the current level of security L
curr(i) ∈ L, the desired level of security
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Lnew(i) ∈ L, the current battery level b(i)
inBattery, an indication of the delay allowance level d(i) ∈ Delay, and a detected
alert threat(i) ∈ Threats.
The network reconfiguration function is similarly defined as:
net reconf : Cnet × L× L×Delay → Cnet (2.9)
Chapter 3
A case study: WSN security
In this chapter, we address the main security issues arising in networks composed
of resource-constrained devices, showing that providing high levels of security in
those networks is a complex and challenging task, due to the inescapable trade-off
among security and performance. Even if most of the considerations apply to a
wide range of constrained architectures, in order to be able to refer to real appli-
cations, we will explicitly refer to Wireless Sensor Networks. In this chapter in
particular, the peculiar HW/SW features of sensor nodes are described, highlighting
the main consequent challenges for security and performance, and the most com-
mon attacks against WSNs are presented, along with some of the most relevant
security solutions proposed in the literature.
3.1 Wireless Sensor Networks: an overview
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are usually composed of several sensor nodes
(also called motes), typically self-powered and provided with simple sensing and
forward capabilities, and one or more base stations (BS), often represented by more
powerful devices that act as gateways towards the external world. A high-level
monitoring application usually interacts with the BSs, by sending them commands
or queries, that are spread into the network through radio links.
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A sensor node is composed of several parts: a radio transceiver with an internal
antenna or connection to an external antenna, a microcontroller, an electronic
circuit for interfacing with the sensors and an energy source, usually a battery or
an embedded form of energy harvesting.
TinyOS [27] is the most commonly adopted operating system for WSNs. TinyOS
applications and the OS itself are built by connecting so called components,
that represent functional building blocks such as communication protocols, de-
vice drivers, or data analysis modules. During the default compilation process of
TinyOS, these building blocks are converted into a monolithic, static binary, to
enable code optimization and ensure a small memory footprint.
Sensor nodes typically have a small form factor with a limited amount of bat-
tery power, are equipped with small programming memories and microprocessor
boards with limited computational capabilities. The communication range of sen-
sor nodes is also limited, both because of technical constraints and by the need to
conserve energy; sensor nodes are prone to failure due to loss of power, and are
often left unattended because they are typically deployed in hostile and harmful
environments.
A typical monitoring system is made of different sensor networks that can be
heterogeneous in the technology aspects, in the data formats, in synchronization
and localization standards and so on. They can be connected in different ways
and their data are elaborated by the same application to enrich the knowledge of
observed complex phenomena. As illustrated in Figure3.1, such an architecture
can be considered as structured into two main layers, namely the sensor network
layer and the distributed application layer.
The sensor network layer can be further divided into two levels:
• Physical level: is responsible of the processing of the locally generated data
at the node level.
• Transport level: controls the communication between the nodes of the net-
work.
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The application layer deals with the fusion and high level management of the data
sensed by the different heterogeneous networks; it can be considered as structured
into two levels:
• Integration level: is responsible of the integration of data belonging to dif-
ferent sensor networks; it typically enforces a translation in a common data
model.
• User level: executes the user distributed applications, which typically query
the underlying networks and sensor features and manipulate the retrieved
results for aggregation and decision purposes.
Figure 3.1: A monitoring system layered view
3.2 WSN security issues
WSNs are widely used in several application domains as environmental moni-
toring, detection and classification of objects in military and civil settings, agri-
culture procedures, automotive and health monitoring. Their decentralized and
self-organizing nature makes the deployment very easy and this facilitates their
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adoption in any context without requiring the existence of any supporting infras-
tructure. Furthermore, they are widely employed in critical scenarios and security
issues are becoming a fundamental concern to be addressed by means of proper
security policies and mechanisms.
Referring to the Figure3.1 in the previous section, security issues arise at all the
architectural levels depicted in it: at the application layer, data retrieved from the
different networks are typically processed in a distributed manner, thus raising
well-known issues dealing with secure network communication and access control;
as this kind of processing is usually done by PC-class devices, the application layer
does not suffer of the problems related to the limited resources of sensor nodes,
and the well-known security protocols can be directly applied.
As for the sensor network layer : at the transport level it is necessary to secure
data exchanged between nodes, and this can be achieved with the adoption of
proper security protocols and mechanisms that take in consideration the limited
resources; at the physical level, it is necessary to provide mechanisms for protecting
nodes against physical tampering and DOS and jamming attacks.
3.3 Security vulnerabilities in WSNs
The wireless nature of WSNs communications makes it possible to wage different
types of attacks ranging from passive eavesdropping to active interfering. In this
section we present a classification of WSN security threats, based on recent surveys
[28–30].
3.3.1 Attacks classification based on attacker capabilities
External Vs. Internal. External attacks are waged by nodes that do not
belong to the WSN, while internal attacks occur when legitimate nodes of a WSN
are compromised and behave in unintended or unauthorized ways.
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Mote-class Vs. Laptop-class. In mote-class attacks, an adversary attacks
a WSN by using a few nodes with similar capabilities to the network nodes; in
laptop-class attacks, an adversary can use more powerful devices (e.g., a laptop) to
attack a WSN. These devices have greater transmission range, processing power,
and energy reserves than the network nodes.
3.3.2 Attacks classification based on attackers goals
Eavesdropping. In a sensor network, the base station typically sends commands
and queries to sensors, that monitor specific physical phenomena and report to
the base station accordingly. Eavesdropping threatens confidentiality as it aims
at gaining unauthorized access to data contained in exchanged packets.
Node capture. This attack aims at compromising a network node by tampering
with the hardware to extract the program code, data and keys stored within a
sensor node, or by attempting to load the attacker program in the compromised
node. It also involves breaking the software running on the sensor nodes. Once a
node is captured, the attacker becomes an insider and can use the node to perform
internal attacks.
Interruption. This attack threatens service availability, as it aims at making
communication links in sensor networks become lost or unavailable. The main
purpose is to launch denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
Modification. An unauthorized party not only accesses the data but also tampers
with it. This threatens message integrity. The main purpose is to confuse or
mislead the parties involved in the communication protocol.
Fabrication. An adversary injects false data and compromises the trustworthi-
ness of information. This threatens message authenticity. The main purpose is
to confuse or mislead the parties involved in the communication protocol. This
operation can also facilitate DOS attacks, by flooding the network.
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Replay existing messages. This operation threatens message freshness. Again,
the main purpose of this operation is to confuse or mislead the parties involved in
the communication protocol that is not time-aware.
Protocol-specific compromise. This includes all the attacks on information
in transit, and also includes deviating from protocols: when the attacker is, or
becomes an insider of the network, and the attackers purpose is not to threaten
the service availability, message confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of the
network, but to gain an unfair advantage for itself in the usage of the network,
the attacker manifests selfish behaviors, behaviors that deviate from the intended
functioning of the protocol.
3.3.3 Attacks classification based on protocol stack
WSN attacks can be classified based on the layer in the protocol stack that they
are targeted at. As classical wireless networks, WSN architectures follow the OSI
Model, consisting in five layers: application layer, transport layer, network layer,
data link layer and physical layer.
3.3.3.1 Physical Layer
The physical layer is responsible for frequency selection, carrier frequency genera-
tion, signal detection, modulation, and data encryption. Sensor networks typically
operate in hostile outdoor environments. In such environments, the small form fac-
tor of the sensors, coupled with the unattended and distributed nature of their
deployment make them highly susceptible to physical attacks, i.e., threats due to
physical node destructions.
Attackers can extract cryptographic secrets, tamper with the associated circuitry,
modify programming in the sensors, or replace them with malicious sensors under
the control of the attacker.
Jamming: This is one of the Denial of Service attacks in which the adversary
attempts to disrupt the operation of the network by broadcasting a high-energy
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signal. Jamming attacks in WSNs can be waged in different ways, that is by
corrupting packets as they are transmitted, sending a constant stream of bytes into
the network to make it look like legitimate traffic, randomly alternating between
sleep and jamming to save energy, and transmitting a jam signal when it senses
traffic.
There are several attack techniques:
• Spot Jamming: the attacker directs all its transmitting power on a single
frequency that the target uses with the same modulation and enough power
to override the original signal. Spot jamming is usually very powerful, but
since it jams a single frequency each time it may be easily avoided by changing
to another frequency.
• Sweep Jamming : a jammer shifts rapidly from one frequency to another.
While this method of jamming has the advantage of being able to jam mul-
tiple frequencies in quick succession, it does not affect them all at the same
time, and thus its effectiveness is limited.
• Barrage Jamming : a range of frequencies is jammed at the same time.
Its main advantage is that it is able to jam multiple frequencies at once
with enough power to decrease the SNR of the enemy receivers. However as
the range of the jammed frequencies grows bigger the output power of the
jamming is reduced proportionally.
Algorithms that combine statistically analyzing the received signal strength indi-
cator (RSSI) values, the average time required to sense an idle channel (carrier
sense time), and the packet delivery ratio (PDR) techniques can reliably identify
jamming. As a defense against jamming attack, spread-spectrum techniques for
radio communication are adopted.
Radio interference. In this type of attack the adversary produces large amounts
of interference either intermittently or persistently. To handle this issue it is
possible to use symmetric key algorithms in which the disclosure of the keys is
delayed by some time interval.
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Tampering or destruction. Given physical access to a node, an attacker can
extract sensitive information such as cryptographic keys or other data on the node.
One defense to this attack involves tamper-proofing the nodes physical package,
adopting for example Self Destruction (tamper-proofing packages) devices. In
such devices, whenever somebody accesses the sensor nodes physically the nodes
vaporize their memory contents and this prevents any leakage of information.
3.3.3.2 Data Link Layer
The link layer is responsible for multiplexing of data-streams, data frame detection,
medium access control, and error control. Attacks at this layer include purposefully
created collisions, resource exhaustion, and unfairness in allocation.
Continuous Channel Access (Exhaustion). A malicious node disrupts the
Media Access Control protocol, by continuously requesting or transmitting over
the channel. This eventually leads a starvation for other nodes in the network with
respect to channel access. One of the countermeasures to such an attack is Rate
Limiting to the MAC admission control, such that the network can ignore excessive
requests, thus preventing the energy drain caused by repeated transmissions. A
second technique is to use time-division multiplexing where each node is allocated
a time slot in which it can transmit.
Collision. This is very much similar to the continuous channel attack. A collision
occurs when two nodes attempt to transmit on the same frequency simultaneously.
When packets collide, a change will likely occur in the data portion, causing a
checksum mismatch at the receiving end. The packet will then be discarded as
invalid. A typical defense against collisions is the use of error-correcting codes.
Unfairness. Repeated application of these exhaustion or collision based MAC
layer attacks or an abusive use of cooperative MAC layer priority mechanisms,
can lead into unfairness. This kind of attack is a partial DOS attack, but results
in marginal performance degradation. A defensive measure against such attacks
is the usage of small frames, so that any individual node seizes the channel for a
smaller duration only.
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Interrogation. Exploits the two-way request-to-send/clear to send (RTS/CTS)
handshake that many MAC protocols use to mitigate the hidden-node problem.
An attacker can exhaust a nodes resources by repeatedly sending RTS messages
to elicit CTS responses from a targeted neighbor node. To thwart such type of
attacks, a node can limit itself in accepting connections from same identity or use
anti-replay protection and strong link-layer authentication.
Sybil Attack. In this attack a single malicious node assumes several identities,
known as Sybil nodes. Many MAC protocols adopt voting for finding the better
link for transmission from a pool of available links. The Sybil Attack could be
used to steer the voting process.
3.3.3.3 Network Layer
The major function of this layer is routing. This layer presents many challenges,
due to limited power, memory and computational capability resources, and is
subject to several attacks.
Sinkhole. In a Sinkhole attack a compromised node tries to draw all or as much
as possible traffic from a particular area, by making itself look attractive to the
surrounding nodes with respect to the routing metric. As a result, the adversary
manages to attract all traffic that is destined to the base station. By taking part
in the routing process, she can then launch more severe attacks, like selectively
forwarding, modifying or even dropping the packets coming through.
Hello Flood. This attack exploits Hello packets that are required in many pro-
tocols to announce nodes to their neighbors. A node receiving such packets may
assume that it is in radio range of the sender. A laptop-class adversary can send
this kind of packet to all sensor nodes in the network, so that they believe the com-
promised node belongs to their neighbors. This causes a large number of nodes
sending packets to this imaginary neighbor and thus into oblivion. Authentication
is the key solution to such attacks.
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Selective Forwarding / Black Hole Attack. WSNs are usually multi-hop net-
works and hence based on the assumption that the participating nodes will forward
the messages faithfully. Malicious or attacking nodes can however refuse to route
certain messages and drop them. If they drop all the packets through them, then
it is called a Black Hole Attack. However if they selectively forward the packets,
then it is called selective forwarding. To overcome this, Multi-path routing can
be used in combination with random selection of paths to destination, or braided
paths can be used which represent paths which have no common link or which do
not have two consecutive common nodes, or use implicit acknowledgments, which
ensure that packets are forwarded as they were sent.
Sybil Attack. A previously said, in this attack, a single node presents multiple
identities to all other nodes in the WSN. This may mislead other nodes, and hence
routes believed to be disjoint with respect to node can have the same adversary
node. A countermeasure to Sybil Attack is by using a unique shared symmetric
key for each node with the base station.
Wormhole Attacks. An adversary can tunnel messages received in one part of
the network over a low latency link and replay them in another part of the network.
This is usually done with the coordination of two adversary nodes, where the nodes
try to understate their distance from each other, by broadcasting packets along
an out-of-bound channel available only to the attacker. To overcome this, the
traffic can be routed to the base station along the geographically shortest path,
or it is possible to use very tight time synchronization among the nodes, which is
infeasible in practical environments.
Spoofed, Altered, or Replayed Routing Information. The most direct at-
tack against a routing protocol in any network is to target the routing information
itself while it is being exchanged between nodes. An attacker may spoof, alter,
or replay routing information in order to disrupt traffic in the network. These
disruptions include the creation of routing loops, attracting or repelling network
traffic from select nodes, extending and shortening source routes, generating fake
error messages, partitioning the network, and increasing end-to-end latency. A
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countermeasure against spoofing and alteration is to append a message authen-
tication code (MAC) after the message. Efficient encryption and authentication
techniques can defeat spoofing attacks.
Acknowledgment Spoofing. Routing algorithms used in sensor networks some-
times require Acknowledgments to be used. An attacking node can spoof the
Acknowledgments of overheard packets destined to neighboring nodes in order to
provide false information to those neighboring nodes. The most obvious solution
to this problem would be authentication via encryption of all sent packets and also
packet headers.
Misdirection. This is a more active attack in which a malicious node present
in the routing path can send the packets in wrong directions through which the
destination is unreachable. Instead of sending the packets in correct direction the
attacker misdirects them towards one node that can thus become the victim of
a DOS attack. If it gets observed that a node’s network link is getting flooded
without any useful information then the victim node can be scheduled into sleep
mode for some time to over come this.
Internet Smurf Attack. In this type of attack the adversary can flood the victim
node’s network link. The attacker forges the victim’s address and broadcasts
echoes in the network and also routes all the replies to the victim node. This
way the attacker can flood the network link of the victim. If it gets observed that
a node’s network link is getting flooded without any useful information then the
victim node can be scheduled into sleep mode for some time to over come this.
Homing. It uses traffic pattern analysis to identify and target nodes that have
special responsibilities, such as cluster heads or cryptographic-key managers. An
attacker then achieves DoS by jamming or destroying these key network nodes.
Header encryption is a common prevention technique. Using dummy packets
throughout the network to equalize traffic volume and thus prevent traffic analysis.
Unfortunately, this wastes significant sensor node energy, so it can be sued only
when preventing traffic analysis is of utmost importance.
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3.3.3.4 Transport Layer
The function of this layer is to provide reliability and congestion avoidance to the
communication. The attacks that can be launched on the transport layer in a
WSN are flooding attack and de-synchronization attack.
Flooding. An attacker may repeatedly make new connection requests until the
resources required by each connection are exhausted or reach a maximum limit.
One proposed solution to this problem is to require that each connecting client
demonstrates its commitment to the connection by solving a puzzle. As a defense
against this class of attack, a limit can be put on the number of connections from
a particular node.
De-synchronization Attacks. In this attack, the adversary repeatedly forges
messages to one or both end points which request transmission of missed frames.
Hence, these messages are again transmitted and if the adversary maintains a
proper timing, it can prevent the end points from exchanging any useful infor-
mation. This will cause a considerable drainage of energy of legitimate nodes in
the network in an endless synchronization-recovery protocol. A possible solution
to this type of attack is to require authentication of all packets including con-
trol fields communicated between hosts. Header or full packet authentication can
defeat such an attack.
3.3.3.5 Application Layer
This layer is responsible for traffic management, and provides software for different
applications that translate the data in an understandable form or send queries to
obtain certain information.
Overwhelm attack. An attacker might attempt to overwhelm network nodes
with sensor stimuli, causing the network to forward large volumes of traffic to a
base station. This attack consumes network bandwidth and drains node energy.
We can mitigate this attack by carefully tuning sensors so that only the specifi-
cally desired stimulus, such as vehicular movement, as opposed to any movement,
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triggers them. Rate-limiting and efficient data-aggregation algorithms can also
reduce these attacks effects.
Path-based DOS attack. It involves injecting spurious or replayed packets into
the network at leaf nodes. This attack can starve the network of legitimate traffic,
because it consumes resources on the path to the base station, thus preventing
other nodes from sending data to the base station. Combining packet authentica-
tion and anti-replay protection prevents these attacks.
Deluge (reprogram) attack. Network-programming system let you remotely
reprogram nodes in deployed networks If the reprogramming process is not secure,
an intruder can hijack this process and take control of large portions of a network.
3.4 Existing approaches to securing a WSN
As previously said, WSN nodes are typically provided with constrained processing
and storage capabilities and limited energy resources; they are prone to failures
due to harsh deployment environments and are easy to be compromised due to typ-
ically unattended operations. Finally, a WSN is often characterized by a dynamic
topology due to node joining, mobility or failure, thus introducing further secu-
rity and reliability issues. The specific features of the sensor nodes make difficult
the direct application of the existing security approaches to the area of wireless
sensor networks: most security protocols are based on cryptographic operations,
which massively involve the adoption of keys and complex mathematical functions
that require dedicated computational resources and turn out to be critical from a
performance and power consumption point of view.
The security of a cryptographic system relies mainly on the secrecy of the key it
uses. Keys for these cryptographic operations must be set up by communicating
nodes before they can exchange information securely. Key management schemes
are mechanisms used to establish and distribute various kinds of cryptographic
keys in the network, such as individual keys, pair wise keys, and group keys.
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Key management is an essential cryptographic primitive upon which other security
primitives are built. If an attacker can find the key, the entire system is broken. In
fact, a secure key management scheme is the prerequisite for the security of these
primitives, and thus essential to achieving secure infrastructure in sensor networks.
In sensor networks end-to-end encryption is impractical because of large number
of communicating nodes and each node is incapable of storing large number of
encryption keys. Therefore hop-by-hop encryption mechanism is usually used in
which each sensor node stores only encryption keys shared with its immediate
neighbors.
So, the main problem to face with when setting up a secure communication be-
tween nodes is the way cryptographic keys are established at each node. There
are two main well-known mechanisms to handle this problem: in Symmetric Key
Cryptography (SKC) a unique secret shared key is used for both encrypting and
decrypting messages, while in Public Key Cryptography (PKC) each node man-
ages a couple of keys.
The process by which public key and symmetric key cryptography schemes should
be selected is based on the following criteria:
• Energy: how much energy is required to execute the encrypt/decryption
functions
• Program memory: the memory required to store the encryption/decryption
program
• Temporary memory: the required RAM size or number of registers required
temporarily when the encryption/decryption code is being executed
• Execution time: the time required to execute the encryption/decryption code
• Program parameters memory: the required memory size to save the required
number of keys used by the encryption/decryption function
Due to WSN nodes constraints, asymmetric cryptography is often too expensive for
many applications. Thus, a promising approach is to use more efficient symmetric
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cryptographic alternatives. However, symmetric cryptography is not as versatile
as public key cryptographic techniques, which complicates the design of secure
applications. Applying any encryption scheme requires transmission of extra bits,
hence extra processing, memory and battery power, which are very important
resources for the sensors longevity. Applying the security mechanisms such as
encryption could also increase delay, jitter and packet loss in WSNs.
Several implementations of Symmetric Key Cryptography (SKC) algorithms in
WSN have been proposed in literature (TinySec [31], MiniSec [32], ZigBee [33]
and SNEP [34]), thanks to their low computational costs that make them well
suited for realization on sensor devices. Even if symmetric schemes are very at-
tractive for their energy and memory efficiency, they require complex and resource
expensive key distribution and management protocols, resulting in a heavy traffic
in the network and in complex and not scalable architectures. Moreover, symmet-
ric cryptography only fulfills confidentiality requirements, while not considering
other security issues such as authentication and integrity. As a matter of fact, an
important security requirement which arises within the sensor network domain is
the broadcast authentication, that is the capacity of a sender to broadcast mes-
sages to multiple nodes in an authenticated way, which can be achieved only via
asymmetric schemes.
The use of asymmetric schemes in sensor networks has been usually considered
as “nearly impossible” because they are power consuming and require a large
amount of computational and storage resources. However, such schemes are very
attractive, because they can ensure a higher degree of security while guaranteeing
a greater flexibility and manageability than symmetric ones: thanks to them,
any two sensors can establish a secure channel between themselves; moreover, as
nodes do not share the same common key for encrypting/decrypting messages,
the “capture” of some sensor devices will not affect the security of others. Rivest-
Shamir-Adelman (RSA) algorithm [35] and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
[5] are among the most well known public key algorithms used in security systems,
the latter being an approach to public-key cryptography based on the algebraic
structure of elliptic curves over finite fields.
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Many protocols have been developed based on the ECC operations, as the Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement technique [5], which provides two
communicating nodes with the possibility of achieving the same secret key with-
out physically exchanging it across the network, and the Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [5] a variant of the Digital Signature Algorithm
(DSA) that operates on elliptic curve groups, which can be used for signature
generation and verification.
We analyzed some of the most recent solutions proposed in the literature to protect
data exchanged among sensor nodes, and selected two available libraries, namely
WMECC [6] and TinyPairing[7], both based on ECC, providing different levels
of security and having different resource utilization profiles. We adopted these
two libraries to build two different cryptosystems for securing data exchanged
among nodes running a reference monitoring application (details are given in the
next Chapter). The two developed cryptosystems were made available to the
reconfiguration framework to build a reconfigurable security layer.
The next Chapter gives an overview of the chosen libraries, and presents and
discusses the analysis conducted on their performance, energy consumption and
intrinsic security level.
Chapter 4
Building a reconfigurable security
layer for WSNs
This chapter describes two different possible configurations of the security layer
of a WSN, based on the WM-ECC and TinyPairing libraries respectively. Such
libraries have been selected among the most recent solutions based on ECC and
were adopted to secure data exchanged among nodes running a reference moni-
toring application. The chapter presents and discusses the analysis conducted on
performance, consumption and intrinsic security of these two cryptosystems.
4.1 The adopted security layer configurations
In this section we will give some details about the two cryptosystems (WM-ECC
and TinyPairing) adopted to secure our reference monitoring application and used
as the available configurations at the security layer in our reconfiguration strategy.
4.1.1 The WM-ECC-based cryptosystem
The first considered cryptosystem is based on the WM-ECC library [6], a publicly
available open source implementation of a 160-bit ECC cryptosystem targeted to
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MICAz, TelosB and Tmote Sky platforms, based on recommended 160-bit SECG
elliptic curve parameters [secp160r].
Fundamental ECC operations are based on large integer arithmetic operations
over finite fields as multiplication, division and modular reduction; in order to
improve the performances of encrypting/decrypting operations, authors of WM-
ECC library have exploited several optimizations and implemented parts of such
operations directly in assembly language, in order to have a complete control of
the register utilization.
WM-ECC provides support for all the ECC operations and gives an optimized
implementation of the ECDSA protocol for digital signature generation and veri-
fication, relying upon techniques such as sliding-window and Shamir trick; it does
not provide an implementation of the ECDH protocol, which we supplied by ex-
ploiting the basic ECC primitives and the main TinyOS components.
WM-ECC has been proved to be more computationally efficient than its ma-
jor counterparts like TinyECC and EccM2.0: for example, on MICAz platform,
TinyECC is 42% slower in signature generation, and on TelosB platform, the per-
formance gap increases to 180%.
From an implementation point of view, WM-ECC is composed of 3 modules:
• Bint - provides optimized subroutines for large integer operations;
• ECC - based on the Bint module, implements all ECC operations;
• ECDSA - provides digital signature generation and verification primitives.
The WM-ECC library has been used to:
• implement the ECDH protocol for achieving a common secret key to be used
for establishing a secure communication channel between the master and
each of the motes;
• provide digital signature generation at the master side and verification at the
mote side, by using the ECDSA primitives;
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The secret shared key achieved via the ECDH protocol is used as a symmetric key
for encrypting and decrypting the messages exchanged between the master (base
station) and the motes with the Skipjack cypher [36], characterized by 80 bit keys
and 64 bit blocks. The cypher has been used in such a way that the motes encrypt
the result messages’ payload after verifying the signature sent by the master, and
the master decrypts such messages in order to get the results and forward them
via the UART interface to the overlying application.
Let’s first consider the implementation of the key agreement protocol. In order
to implement the ECDH protocol the EcdhC component has been added to the
WM-ECC library: this component uses the key agree function implemented in the
EcdhM module and accessible via the Ecdh interface; it is connected to the EccC
component, providing all the ECC operations, and to the SHA1M ncsu module,
which provides the implementation of SHA-1 used by the Key derivation function
(KDC).
The main steps performed by the protocol are the following:
1. after an initialization phase, the master generates a random key KM in the
[1,n-1] interval, and performs a scalar product to calculate its own public
point Q1=KM*P, where P is the base point on the curve.
2. at the same time the mote, after an initialization phase, generates a random
key Km in the [1,n-1] interval, and calculate its own public point Q2=Km*P.
3. the master inserts Q1 into a message and sends such message to the mote.
4. the mote receives the message from the master, extracts Q1 and performs
a scalar product in order to obtain the secret S=km*Q1; then it sends its
public point to the master in a message.
5. the master receives the message from the mote, extracts Q2 and calculates
the shared secret S=KM*Q2.
As for digital signature operations, we used the ECDSA primitives in order that:
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1. the master node, at the arrival of a query from the UART interface, con-
structs a query packet with the received parameters, digitally signs it and
then broadcasts it to the motes via the radio channel;
2. when receiving a query packet, a mote first verifies the digital signature and,
if it turns to be successful, starts to sample the required physical values
according to the query parameters; the retrieved results are collected and in-
serted into the payload of the response packet, which is previously encrypted
before being sent back to the master with the secret key obtained after the
ECDH protocol.
3. the master receives the response packet, extract its payload and decrypts it
by using the shared secret obtained after the ECDH protocol. Then, the
master returns the result values to the querying wrapper through the UART
interface.
The encryption/decryption operations are carried out by means of the Skipjack
cypher, realized by a custom TinyOS component implementing the BlockCypher
TinyOS interface; such cypher uses the key derived by the ECDH protocol as the
cryptographic key for encrypting the communication channel between the master
and the motes. In order to reduce the overhead resulting by the cryptographic
operations, we have chosen to encrypt only response packets sent by the motes to
the master, and let only the master do decrypting operations to get the requested
data.
We developed two different applications, respectively for the master and the mote
side. The master application has been implemented so that it starts the ECDH
protocol (step 1) when a timer expires: at the system setup a timer starts to
run, and after 5 seconds an event is generated, handled by the master application
which will calculate the master’s public point and send it to the motes. The master
application has been configured in order to digitally sign outgoing query packets
addressed to the motes and decrypt the incoming response packets before sending
the results to the wrapper. The mote application in turn, has been configured in
order to be able to perform the ECDH protocol initiated by the master, verify the
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digital signature of the incoming query packets, and encrypt all outgoing response
packets.
In Figure 4.1 the execution of a query in a network, secured with the presented
WM-ECC-based cryptosystem, is shown: at the system startup (red box in figure)
the master node starts the ECDH protocol in order to achieve a common shared
secret with each of the motes, then digitally signs every outgoing query packet
and decrypts the incoming response packets before sending the results to the high
level querying application. The mote in turn, is able to verify the digital signature
of the incoming query packets, and to encrypt all outgoing response packets.
Figure 4.1: Query execution in a network secured with the WM-ECC-based cryp-
tosystem
4.1.2 The TinyPairing-based cryptosystem
TinyPairing [7] is an open-source pairing-based cryptographic library for wireless
sensors, designed to reduce memory occupancy (both ROM and RAM). It pro-
vides efficient and lightweight implementation of bilinear pairing, pairing-related
functions and associated elliptic curve arithmetic operations such as scalar multi-
plication, point addition and more, and is the most efficient pairing based NesC
implementation currently available.
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In their implementation, the authors include three well-known pairing-based cryp-
tographic schemes which have been employed in some recent solutions to secure
WSNs: Boneh-Franklin Identity-Based Encryption (BF IBE) basic scheme [37],
Boneh, Lynn and Shacham’s Short Signature (BLS SS) scheme [38], and Boneh
and Boyen’s Short Signature (BB SS) scheme [39].
The entire library is written in nesC for TinyOS v2.x without using any hardware-
dependent code, so it is easy to port to most of sensor platforms. Figure 4.2 shows
the sequence of operations needed for executing a query in the TinyPairing-based
cryptosystem that we set up.
Figure 4.2: Query execution in a network secured with the TinyPairing based cryp-
tosystem
• In the pre-deployment phase (red box in figure), carried out in a protected
environment, the master node is assigned a unique 8 byte identifier based on
manufacturer and serial number information and performs two operations:
in the key setup operation it uses a randomly chosen large integer (secret
master key) and generator point to obtain a public point ; in the key extract
operation, the master key and the unique 8 byte ID are used to achieve the
master private key (dID) associated with its public ID, which will be used in
decrypting operations.
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The master ID, its public point and the random generator point are sent to
each of the motes, as this information is necessary in signature verifying and
response encrypting operations.
• At the arrival of a query from the UART interface, the master builds a query
packet with the received parameters, digitally signs it with its master key
(according to the BLS SS scheme) and then broadcasts it to the motes via
the radio channel;
• When receiving a query packet, a mote first verifies the digital signature
using the master public point and generator point, achieved during the pre-
deployment phase and, if the verification turns to be successful, starts to
sample the required physical values according to the query parameters; each
retrieved sample is collected and inserted into the payload of a response
packet, which is encrypted using the master ID (according to the BF IBE
scheme) before being sent back to the master;
• The master receives the response packet, extract its payload and decrypts it
with its private key dID ; then, the master returns the result values to the
high level querying application through the UART interface.
As illustrated, the query process is very similar to the WM-ECC based protocol,
except for the key agreement phase that is more secure: only the master node
calculates key information and sends the necessary parameters to the motes in
order to let them perform cryptographic operations.
4.2 Security and Performance Analysis
The introduction of security mechanisms within a sensor network is a desirable
feature but it may introduce a very heavy overhead that must be addressed by
any sensor networks developer and deployer.
We conducted specific analysis aimed at:
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• measuring and comparing performance and power consumption of the two
proposed cryptosystems
• defining the intrinsic level of security provided by each cryptosystem, based
on the security requirements they are able to ensure (static security analysis)
These information, in fact, should be taken into account by any designer to meet
her security and performance requirements.
For our experiments we adopted two different hardware platforms, commonly used
by the scientific community, and both provided by CrossBow:
• TelosB motes, provided with a MSP430, 16 bit-processor, a CC2420 ra-
dio chip, 10kB internal RAM, 48kB flash programming memory and 1024k
memory for measurements,
• MicaZ motes, based on a MPR2400, 8 bit-processor, a CC2420 radio chip,
4k byte RAM, 128k flash programming memory and 512k memory for mea-
surements.
The following sections discuss the experimental results obtained from performance,
power consumption and security level evaluation for the proposed cryptosystems.
4.2.1 Performance evaluation
In order to evaluate the performance of the two given cryptosystems, we measured
the following parameters on both hardware platform introduced in the previous
section:
• latency introduced in the whole monitoring architecture
• overhead introduced by the protocol
• resource occupation to elaborate cryptographic functions on single nodes
Details about the achieved results are given in the following.
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4.2.1.1 Latency
Cryptosystem WM-ECC TinyPairing
TELOSB MICAZ TELOSB MICAZ
Initialization 1,428436 1,258555 17,083984 10,180664
Key Exchanging 1,583069 0,062666
Sign 1,49704 1,344894 8,694336 5,540033
Verify 2,24049 1,984192 30,163086 17,867188
Data Encrypting 0,001221 0,00034 27,884766 15,972656
Data Decrypting 0,001252 0,000334 13,019531 7,838867
Table 4.1: Latency in seconds
In Table 4.1 the latency introduced by the security protocols is reported and com-
pared. As illustrated, WM-ECC presents much better performance than Tiny-
Pairing, thanks to the adoption of a hybrid approach relying on a fast symmetric
cypher, compared to the asymmetric scheme adopted in TinyPairing. As expected,
increasing the security of the protocols is paid against a performance loss. From
a network designer point of view, an encryption time of abut 28 seconds (Tiny-
Pairing) implies that we cannot choose a sample period shorter than this interval,
otherwise, without buffering capabilities, we will loose samples. Clearly, this could
have a high impact on the monitoring application functional requirements.
By observing the table, it can be easily noted that signature and verification as well
as encryption and decryption operations are strongly asymmetric in computation
time for the TinyPairing cryptosystem. This is due to the specific sequence of
additional operations that are needed to implement the TinyPairing mechanism.
As for the signature verification, in fact, it requires a double call of the same
pairing function with different input parameters; as for the encryption, it requires
a sequence of different operations to initialize the ECC-based algorithm (hash-to-
point, point scalar multiplication, ...) as illustrated in [7].
Latency could be reduced by buffering some samples and encrypting them all
together (at most 4 samples in this case, as the maximum data block that can be
encrypted in a single step is 8 bytes and a single sample only occupies 2 bytes).
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4.2.1.2 Packet overhead
Figure 4.3: Packet length in bytes
In Figure4.3 the packet overhead introduced by the two cryptosystems is compared
with the not secure version. In order to make the security application feasible, we
had to increase the payload length in both cases from the default 29 bytes.
In particular, for the WM-ECC based network, we sized the packet to 80 bytes
to enable the transmission of the public points and digital signatures; for the
TinyPairing based network, we sized the packet to 60 bytes for the transmission
of the encrypted packets. In general, packet size is a very crucial parameter as
this also has a bad impact on battery consumption, usually very high during the
transmission phase; it could be reduced by performing a little variation in the
protocol consisting in splitting packets in two or three portions in order to fit
smaller dimensions.
4.2.1.3 Memory occupancy
As for resource occupancy, encryption and authentication operations produce an
additional cost in terms of memory and CPU. In Figures 4.4 and 4.5 the memory
overhead is reported in terms of RAM and ROM usage respectively on master and
end-nodes.
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Figure 4.4: RAM occupancy in bytes for master and mote applications
Figure 4.5: ROM occupancy in bytes for master and mote applications
As illustrated, the secure query applications imply a higher RAM and ROM usage
both on master and mote sides (even 5 times more), compared to the simple query
application without security. Anyway, this is not a problem as Telosb motes have
48K bytes of memory and other common platforms, as MicaZ, have even more
storage capabilities (128K).
As final remark, from a design point of view, the resulting values can be considered
acceptable assuming to deploy sensor nodes that only run a monitoring application
at a time, and depending on the available resources and on the security require-
ments, many solutions can be adopted based on different cryptographic schemes
and protocols.
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4.2.2 Power consumption evaluation
In order to measure the power consumption associated with the two cryptosystems,
we adopted AVRORA [40], a set of simulation and analysis tools for programs
written for the AVR microcontroller produced by Atmel (installed on the Mica2
sensor platforms).
We considered separately the three phases of initialization, signing and sampling,
and measured the energy consumption associated to CPU and radio transceiver
for these phases. Results are shown in Table4.2.
Cryptosystem WM-ECC TinyPairing
CPU RADIO CPU RADIO
Initialization 2,48423E-09 5,64598E-09 2,27555E-10 1,04346E-09
Sign 1,92191E-09 6,95544E-09 1,25765E-09 4,67708E-09
Sampling 1,92203E-09 6,9554E-09 2,135E-09 7,5457E-09
Table 4.2: Power consumption in Joules
As expected, the cryptosystem based on TinyPairing is characterized by an higher
energy consumption, especially in the sampling phase, that is the most critical
one as it is performed periodically and constitutes the main operation executed
by sensor nodes.
4.2.3 Security evaluation
From the security point of view, the cryptosystem based on WM-ECC does not
authenticate the public keys, thus allowing man-in-the-middle attacks in the key
exchange phase. Moreover, sensitive data are encrypted with a symmetric cipher,
that increases vulnerability of the network.
TinyPairing instead, adopts an asymmetric scheme and is much more secure in
the initialization phase as it does not use a key exchange mechanism. As stated
in Chapter 2, the intrinsic level of security of the two configurations can be rep-
resented by an attack coverage table, identifying, for each configuration, what
attacks it is able to thwart or, dually, what requirements it is able to satisfy.
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Conf Man-in-the-middle Eavesdropping Brute force Replay attack
WM-ECC non-auth key yes weak symm no
TinyPairing auth key yes asymm no
Table 4.3: Attacks Coverage Table for the considered cryptosystems
In table 4.3, coverage is not defined as an ON/OFF property, but it is defined
through a score that corresponds to the level of protection provided by the con-
figuration with respect to each considered attack.
Chapter 5
Enforcing WSN reconfiguration:
implementation details and
evaluation
This chapter first discusses some existing approaches to WSN reconfiguration and
then proposes two reconfiguration mechanisms, designed to perform security layer
and physical layer reconfiguration respectively. Finally, it discusses the theoreti-
cal and experimental analyses conducted to prove that the proposed reconfiguration
mechanisms are effective in increasing the complexity for the attacker and, conse-
quently, in decreasing the probability of completing a successful attack.
5.1 WSN reconfiguration in literature
Several reconfiguration mechanisms have been proposed for WSNs, mainly based
on network reprogramming. Embedded systems reprogramming has been widely
addressed in the literature, as it is fundamental to perform management and main-
tenance tasks – e.g., software updates, bug fixes, parameter tuning – in those ap-
plications where it is not possible or convenient to physically access and manually
reconfigure deployed nodes.
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In [41], authors provide an interesting review of reprogramming frameworks, de-
sign challenges, existing systems and approaches, and evaluation metrics for WSN.
They highlight the importance of providing algorithms and protocols that take into
account the limited resources of sensor nodes, the typical unreliability due to wire-
less channels and dynamic topology and the scalability problems, as well as the lim-
itations of the most common operating system running on sensor nodes, TinyOS: it
does not provide reliable memory allocation mechanisms or multi-threading mod-
els, and generates monolithic compiled programs so that components cannot be
separated and reprogrammed independently.
Several existing approaches for sensor network reprogramming perform a full-
image replacement, consisting of completely updating the image of the application
running on nodes.
Deluge [42] is a reliable data dissemination protocol for propagating large data
objects (larger then the RAM size of a node) from one or more source nodes to
many other nodes over a multi-hop network. The protocol operates as a state ma-
chine where each node can be in one of three states at any time: MAINTAIN, RX,
or TX. Deluge implements a three phase Advertise-Request-Data gossip protocol,
in which data is only pushed by a sender upon receiving an explicit request for
data from an immediate neighbor. A node in the MAINTAIN state is responsible
for ensuring that all nodes within communication range have the newest version
of the object profile and all available data for the newest version and this is ob-
tained by occasionally advertising a summary representing the current version of
its object profile and the set of pages (transfer units) from the object which are
available for transmission. When receiving an advertisement for a needed page,
a node moves to the RX state and is responsible for actively requesting the re-
maining packets required to complete page; after a node makes a request, it waits
for a response and makes subsequent requests if some of the data was lost in the
process by using a negative ack mechanism. Deluge limits a node to λ requests
before returning to MAINTAIN; however, if progress (measured as reception rate
of data) is above some threshold Deluge allows the node to continue making re-
quests. While being in the MANTAIN state, if a node receives a request for a
Enforcing WSN reconfiguration: implementation details and evaluation 57
given page locally available, it makes a transition to the TX state, in which it
is responsible for broadcasting all requested packets for the page (continuing to
service any subsequent requests for data from the same page) until all requested
packets have been broadcast; then it goes back to MAINTAIN state. In [? ] a
secure version of Deluge is provided.
Differential image replacement consist of disseminating only changes between a
deployed executable and a new image, reducing overhead. In [43], authors present
an incremental hardware-independent network programming mechanism which re-
programs one-hop wireless sensors quickly by transmitting the incremental changes
for the new program version using the Rsync algorithm, which finds the shared
code blocks between the two program images and allows to distribute just the key
changes.
Zephyr [44] uses an optimized version of the Rsync algorithm to perform byte level
comparison between the old and new executables and provides a multi-hop repro-
gramming protocol; moreover, before performing byte level comparison, Zephyr
performs application level modifications on the old and new versions of the soft-
ware to mitigate the effect of function shifts so that the similarity between the two
versions of the software is increased and the delta size is decreased.
In [45] R2 is proposed, being a unified approach to mitigate both effects of function
shifts and data shifts by using relocatable code: this approach obtains a higher
degree of similarity by keeping all references in the instructions the same in both
program versions and it also makes efficient use of the memory while not degrading
the program quality.
Different approaches are based on dynamic Operating Systems, aimed at obtaining
a modular structure for compiled applications in order to be able to update only
components that actually change.
TinyCubus [46] is based on TinyOS, which is primarily used as a hardware ab-
straction layer. For TinyOS, TinyCubus is the only application running in the
system, and all other applications register their requirements and components
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with it. TinyCubus provides a set of management components that make it pos-
sible for several implementations of an application to coexist on a node, and it is
responsible for dynamically loading components into the sensor’s memory on an
as-needed basis.
Finally, Dynamic TinyOS [47] alters the compilation process of TinyOS in order
to generate an executable consisting of multiple, replaceable objects, so that, after
deployment, updates can be disseminated to replace existing objects on sensor
nodes.
All these replacement techniques are based on dissemination of application binary
images over the network, thus arising security concerns and a substantial overhead
in terms of delays and power consumption and, at the state of the art, they are
not very suitable for the MTD approach.
5.2 Our approach to reconfiguring WSNs
In this section we provide two reconfiguration mechanisms for security layer and
physical layer respectively. To this aim, we will explicitly refer to a WSN architec-
ture, but the discussion can be easily generalized to any distributed architecture
having analogous constraints.
As previously highlighted, security is a fundamental concern in WSNs, as they
are widely adopted in several critical application domains; nevertheless, because
of their peculiar features – constrained processing and storage capabilities, limited
energy resources, highly dynamic topology and mobility, frequent and failures,
– providing security is not a straightforward task. The introduction of security
mechanisms has a strong impact on performance and resource consumption, that
often represent a limiting factor. For this reason, the adoption of a complex
cryptosystem (i.e. based on public key primitives) for the entire network life could
be desirable by a security point of view but not recommendable or not feasible in
practice.
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The proposed reconfiguration approach is able to overcome these concerns, as it
allows to keep an acceptable level of security in the network, by leveraging not
only the intrinsic features of the running cryptosystem, but also other features,
such as the physical configuration and the application interfaces, other than the
reconfiguration mechanism itself, as previously shown. This way, the use of simpler
cryptosystems for a short period of time can be preferred to the adoption of a single
strong but high-consuming cryptosystem. Indeed, a more secure and complex
cryptosystem is still worthy of implementation and use, to cope with new security
requirements for instance, or to thwart specific detected attacks.
Referring to TinyOS, the most commonly adopted operating system for WSNs,
security mechanisms could be implemented either as independent TinyOS compo-
nents or as different static libraries wired in the same component, whose functions
are called by applications to ensure security requirements. Reconfiguration of the
security layer and of the application interfaces could be easily achieved by includ-
ing the implementation of all the available solutions into the firmware installed on
the device, and activating the desired configuration through software switches and
proper protocols. Firmware reconfiguration instead, can be performed by adopting
node reprogramming techniques, that will be shown in details later.
Figure 5.1 shows a sequence diagram representing the network operation in pres-
ence of the reconfiguration mechanism. In the INIT phase each node is loaded
with the application image: according to the above discussed strategies, this could
be either an enriched application featuring different cryptosystems, or a collection
of different application images, each implementing a different cryptosystem and
allocated in the node’s flash memory. Each of the available cryptosystems must
be initialized in order to be used; this is also performed in the INIT phase, which
usually is carried out in a protected environment.
At each time, only one of these cryptosystems will be considered valid for a given
node and used for actual communication. The time interval between two subse-
quent updates is referred to as the validity interval.
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Figure 5.1: Reconfiguration sequence
As illustrated in the MONITOR phase of Figure 5.1, all queries sent by the base
station in a validity interval will be signed using the valid cryptosystem’s signature
protocol, and the signature will be verified by motes adopting the current valid
cryptosystem associated with the base station. Similarly, all responses sent by
a mote in a validity interval will be encrypted using its valid cryptosystem’s en-
cryption method, and decrypted by the base station using the decryption method
belonging to the cryptosystem currently associated with that node.
As illustrated in the RECONFIG phase of Figure 5.1, the update process executed
by a node consists in switching to a selected image or to another cryptosystem from
the available pool (either after receiving a command or making its own decision).
Required cryptographic operations on future outgoing messages will be performed
using the newly selected cryptosystem.
The selection of a new configuration is performed by a security-driven scheduler,
aiming at increasing the level of security which can be measured in terms of the
probability of successfully completing an attack, as shown later. In particular, the
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scheduler will define both the reconfiguration frequency and the new configura-
tions.
In the following subsections, we will focus on the security layer and firmware
reconfiguration respectively, presenting two innovative approaches to provide re-
configuration, with some implementation details.
5.2.1 Security Layer Reconfiguration
In our reference monitoring application, queries are signed by the base station for
authentication purposes, and reply messages are encrypted for ensuring confiden-
tiality and integrity, as shown in the previous Chapter with respect to the adopted
cryptosystems. The security layer performing these operations can be designed to
implement different cryptographic protocols, depending on the required security
level and on available resources. As previously said, the basic idea of the proposed
approach is to dynamically change the security layer, by switching between two
or more different available implementations.
As said in Section 2.2.4, both the base station and the motes can trigger an
update in response to an event, such as detection of malicious activity or timer
expirations. In the simplest scenario, nodes could decide to perform an update by
selecting, based on a shared strategy, the next valid cryptosystem once a shared
timer expires; this approach does not require to exchange information about the
adopted cryptosystems, but it relies upon strict synchronization, which itself can
not be achieved without adding considerable overhead.
In order to control the overhead and increase network flexibility and diversity, we
introduce a different reconfiguration protocol: each node can decide independently
when to update, and an identifier of the cryptosystem used to encrypt a message is
coded in the message itself, so that each receiving node, sharing the same security
configuration, is able to properly handle it.
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As illustrated in Figure5.2, the cryptosystems’ parameters (i.e. the cryptographic
keys) could be either pre-loaded on all network nodes in the INIT phase, or dy-
namically determined in each RECONFIG phases according to the available key
agreement mechanism.
In the first solution all the cryptographic keys are stored in each node for the
whole lifetime of the network, and they can be used as master keys for generating
new keys.
In the second solution, instead, each time a node triggers a local update, it has to
start an initialization procedure according to the chosen cryptosystem to estab-
lish the cryptographic parameters. The initialization procedure usually involves
exchanging messages between the base station and each of the motes, thus expos-
ing the procedure itself to attacks (such as the man-in-the-middle attack for key
agreement operations) and introducing delay in delivering response packets from
the motes’ point of view.
In Figure 5.2, a typical scenario of security protocol reconfiguration is illustrated.
Assume that each node is provided with a pool of different cryptosystem implemen-
tations, which are identified by a unique ID. In the INIT phase, the base station
and the motes agree on cryptosystems’ parameters; initialization depends on the
specific adopted cryptosystem (they can be public points for an ECC based cryp-
tosystem, or system parameters for an identity based [48]) and can be performed
in a secure environment in the pre-deployment phase or later.
As shown in Figure 5.2, after initializing the N available cryptosystems, each node
can independently choose the valid cryptosystem to adopt in order to perform
cryptographic operations in the current validity interval. In particular, the base
station choses the cryptosystem it will use to digitally sign the outgoing queries
in order to assure authentication (CRYPTO(i) in figure); any mote receiving the
query message will use the cryptosystem whose ID is included in the message itself
to verify the signature. Similarly, after verifying the signature, any mote encrypts
data according to the local selected cryptosystem (CRYPTO(j) and CRYPTO(w)
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Figure 5.2: Security protocol reconfiguration
in figure), and the base station will use the ID included in the reply messages to
decrypt them.
The main advantages of this solution relate to improved overall performance. In
fact, there is no latency to swap from a cryptosystem to another and we do not
need to stop the monitoring application during the reconfiguration; even battery
consumption is not affected by this solution.
As for the security of this strategy, if an attacker is aware of the packet format,
she could try to manipulate some fields of the packet, such as those coding the
cryptosystem ID and its parameters, so that nodes are no longer able to communi-
cate. As for query messages, their payload is signed with the base station’s private
key, so that if any field is altered during transmission the signature verification
at mote’s side will not succeed. This could lead to a denial of service attack, as
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motes will not be able to verify the authenticity of queries and will not perform
the required actions. To detect this attack, a timeout could be set by the base
station each time a query is sent; if no results come before the timeout expires,
the query could be sent again to cope with possible message losses; if no results
are returned after few attempts, an alert could be raised. The cryptosystem ID
and information about its parameters are coded in the response messages, too,
as they are necessary to decrypt the message. An attacker could alter such fields
as the messages are not authenticated, but the base station will not be able to
decrypt them causing the loss of some response messages (denial of service). As
a typical network is composed of many redundant mote nodes, this situation can
be considered as not critical.
5.2.2 Physical Layer Reconfiguration
As mentioned in Section 5.1, the Deluge T2 Network reprogramming framework
enables the reconfiguration of a node by sending via radio the new binary image
that should be loaded on the node. As Dutta et al. pointed out in [49], this ap-
proach is unsafe and too battery consuming. We implemented a different approach
to remotely reconfigure each node in the network; we decoupled the reconfigura-
tion mechanisms from the components to enforce the new configuration according
to a scheduling policy.
To this aim, we designed a reconfiguration application by augmenting several
components of the Deluge framework. In particular, we implemented new recon-
figuration functionalities to enable a single node to swap to a new image that was
previously pre-loaded on its storage. The reconfiguration application is defined by
wiring new components specifically designed to manage external reconfiguration
commands, and components designed to manage the images loaded on the node
storage.
As illustrated in the right part of Figure 5.3, the proposed reconfiguration appli-
cation consists of three main components:
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Figure 5.3: Reconfiguration Application components
1. a bootloader component,
2. a reprogramming component,
3. a management component.
The bootloader component is a persistent layer in the architecture, which can
enforce the chosen reconfiguration mechanisms. This component is intended for
TinyOS and it provides needed functionalities to program the node with an already
stored program image. The parameters passed to this component are specified in
the external command and indicate the location of the binary in the external
flash memory to program the node’s microcontroller. When reprogramming is
requested, the bootloader will erase the program flash and write the new binary
to it. On completion, it jumps to the first instruction of the new application.
The reprogramming component is the core of the reconfiguration application; in
this implementation it accepts commands from the base station, but can be ex-
tended to implement a de-centralized reconfiguration approach. This component
is built by connecting two primary subcomponents: the ReProg and the Storage-
Manager. The ReProg component is an extension of the NetProg component of
Deluge T2. It handles a reprogramming request from the network by providing
a dedicated API to initialize a reconfiguration process. When a node wants to
perform a reconfiguration, it only has to invoke this API by specifying the name
of the new binary in the flash memory to load. Subsequently, the ReProg sets
the environment variables needed by the bootloader component and reboots the
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node. The StorageManager component deals with image name resolution, map-
ping names of program images to their respective physical addresses in the external
flash memory.
The management component has a master (base station) and mote side; it is used
to initialize the mote and deploy different images. Usually this operation is done in
a secure environment and it is accessible only during the initialization. The master-
side management component has been derived from the tos-deluge application of
the Deluge T2 Framework, and it is called mote-manager. This component allows
to inject one or more images into the mote by writing directly into nodes’ external
flash memory volumes. It is also possible to erase a volume and ping the status of
a mote to get information about already injected images.
Finally, the reconfiguration application runs on a workstation connected to the
base station, which implements the reprogramming scheduler. As discussed in the
next section, the reprogramming frequency and the new configuration to load can
be chosen to balance overhead and attack probability.
The proposed solution introduces considerable advantages in terms of security
and overall performance with respect to WSN reprogramming approaches based
on code dissemination. In fact, the reconfiguration time is now not dependent
on the image size and the network topology as the images are not sent over the
network but pre-loaded via a serial interface. Furthermore, this approach avoids
any security risk in the dissemination and reduces the battery consumption as the
messages sent are just commands to swap from an image to another one.
The swapping latency is considerably reduced, too; we experimented a reduction
of one order magnitude with respect to the original Deluge approach: from 50
seconds to send a 40Kb image implementing a monitoring application secured
with WM-ECC, to about 6 seconds to perform the swap. The only drawback is
that we need to stop the monitoring application and any query being executed
in order to swap to another cryptosystem. However, any approach based on full
image replacement presents a similar issue. Furthermore, due to storage limitation,
we can only pre-load a limited number of images on board.
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Let us consider attacks aimed at undermining this reconfiguration mechanism. An
attacker could perform a replay attack on control packets sent by the base station
and containing a reconfiguration command, in order to control communication
or just perform a denial of service attack by forcing the motes to continuously
swapping images. Again, this could be avoided by introducing a sequence number
for reconfiguration commands.
5.3 Theoretical Evaluation
The objective of our approach to WSN security is to increase the complexity for
attackers and impair their ability to successfully discover cryptographic keys or
complete various other types of attacks. In the following we show theoretically
how the proposed approach decreases the probability of an attacker successfully
discovering cryptographic keys by brute force attacks.
We assume that the attacker sequentially tests all possible keys for a given cryp-
tosystem. In the worst case for the defender, the attacker can recognize that the
cryptographic system has changed and restart the attack. The attacker may not
know what specific cryptosystem is being used in each interval. In this case, he
will try all cryptosystems from a set of possible candidates. Clearly, more sophisti-
cated types of brute force attacks exist today, compared to the one described here.
Such types of attacks leverage specific properties of a given cryptographic system.
However, our goal here is to evaluate the benefits of the proposed mechanism with
respect to the case where the cryptographic system is never changed during the
lifetime of the wireless network. Therefore, the specific method of attack is not
relevant in our analysis.
Given a time interval [ti, tj], we use Pr(success([ti, tj])) to denote the probabil-
ity that the attacker will successfully discover the key between ti and tj when a
single cryptographic system is used during the interval [ti, tj]. Similarly, we use
Pr(success([ti, tj], n)) to denote the probability that the attacker will successfully
discover the key between ti and tj when the interval [ti, tj] is broken down into
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n validity intervals and a different cryptosystem is used in each such intervals.
Clearly, Pr(success([ti, tj], 1)) = Pr(success([ti, tj])). We can prove the following
theorem.
Theorem 5.1. Let [0, T ] be an observation interval, and let n ∈ N be and integer
greater than or equal to 2. Then the following inequality holds.
Pr(success([0, T ], n)) ≤ Pr(success([0, T ])) (5.1)
Proof. The probability that the attacker will successfully break the cryptosystem
between 0 and T when the interval [0, T ] is broken down into n validity intervals
– and a different cryptosystem is used in each such intervals – can be written as
Pr(success([0, T ], n)) = 1− Pr(¬success([0, T ], n)) (5.2)
The probability Pr(¬success([0, T ], n)) that the attacker does not succeed by time
T is the probability that he does not succeed in any of the n validity intervals.
Pr(¬success([0, T ], n)) = Pr (¬success ([0, 1
n
· T ])
∧¬success ([ 1
n
· T, 2
n
· T ])
∧ . . . ∧ ¬success ([n−1
n
· T, T ]))
(5.3)
The events ¬success ([0, 1
n
· T ]), ¬success ([ 1
n
· T, 2
n
· T ]), . . ., ¬success ([n−1
n
· T, T ])
are clearly independent, thus Pr(¬success([0, T ], n)) can be computed as follows.
Pr(¬success([0, T ], n)) =∏n−1
i=0
(
1− Pr (success ([ i
n
· T, i+1
n
· T ]))) (5.4)
As the probability that the attacker can break the system in a given interval is
directly proportional to the length of the interval itself, we can conclude that, for
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all i ∈ [0, n − 1], Pr (success ([ i
n
· T, i+1
n
· T ])) = Pr(success([0,T ]))
n
. This conclusion
relies on the simplifying assumption that the different cryptosystems used in our
framework are equivalent in terms of attack time. Generalizing this result to
the case of heterogeneous cryptosystems is straightforward, but it is omitted for
reasons of space. Additionally, the above conclusion assumes that the interval
[0, T ] is larger than the time needed to complete a full brute force attack1. Then,
Equation 5.4 can be rewritten as follows.
Pr(¬success([0, T ], n))=∏n−1i=0 (1− Pr(success([0,T ]))n )
=
(
1− Pr(success([0,T ]))
n
)n (5.5)
In order to complete the proof, we need the results of another theorem:
Theorem 5.2. Let x ∈ [0, 1] be a real number and let n ∈ N be an integer number.
The following inequality holds.
(
1− x
n
)n
≥ 1− x (5.6)
Proof. Using the binomial theorem, the expression
(
1− x
n
)n
can be expanded as
follows.
(
1− x
n
)n
=
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)(
−x
n
)k
=1− x+
n∑
k=2
(
n
k
)(
−x
n
)k
(5.7)
To complete the proof, it is sufficient to show that the alternating series
∑n
k=2
(
n
k
) (−x
n
)k
is greater than or equal 0. As the first term in the series is positive, we only need
to show that all the terms have decreasing absolute values. In order to do so, we
now show that the ratio between two consecutive terms is greater than 1.
1If Pr(¬success([0, T ])) = 1, then there may exist a sub-interval [ti, tj ] of [0, T ] such that
Pr(¬success([ti, tj ])) = 1.
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n · (k + 1)
(n− k) · x (5.8)
It is clear that the quantity at the right end side of Equation 5.8 is greater than
1, as n · (k + 1) ≥ n and (n− k) · x ≤ n.
Using Theorem 5.2, we can conclude that
(
1− Pr (success ([0, T ]))
n
)n
≥ 1− Pr (success ([0, T ])) (5.9)
Combining Equations 5.2, 5.5, and 5.9, we can write
1− Pr (success ([0, T ] , n)) ≥ 1− Pr (success ([0, T ])) (5.10)
Equation 5.1 follows directly from Equation 5.10.
In conclusion, Theorem 5.1 shows that, in theory, the proposed mechanism is
effective in reducing the probability that the attacker will successfully discover
currently used cryptographic keys in a given amount of time. In other words, it
will take more time for the attacker to break the system. Experiments reported
in the next section confirm this result.
5.4 Simulation experiments
In this section, we show, through simulation experiments, that the proposed mech-
anisms are effective in increasing the uncertainty and complexity for the attacker,
thus confirming the theoretical results illustrated in the previous section. We as-
sume that the attacker’s goal is to break the system by attempting to discover
the cryptographic keys used to protect communication. Additionally, in this set
of experiments, we assume that security reconfiguration is performed by randomly
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switching among three different cryptosystems. In order to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of security-driven reconfiguration – even in some adverse conditions –
we assume that an attacker is able to understand when the adopted cryptosystem
changes and what kind of cryptosystem is used at each time (e.g., by observing con-
trol messages sent over the network by the base station in the node reconfiguration
strategy, or control flags present in data packets in the protocol reconfiguration
strategy).
Many types of cryptographic attacks can be considered. In our case, an attacker
can only observe encrypted packets traveling on the network, containing infor-
mation about sensed data, and it can perform a brute force attack on captured
packets by systematically testing every possible key for the current (known) valid
cryptosystem – assuming that it is able to determine when the attack is successful.
Given a finite key length and sufficient time, a brute force attack is always suc-
cessful; depending on the adopted algorithm, some well-known weaknesses can be
exploited (e.g., weak keys or equivalent keys) to run a more efficient type of attack.
Nevertheless, for ease of presentation, we consider brute force attacks carried out
by sequentially testing all possible keys.
In particular, we consider two possible cases:
1. the attacker knows the encryption algorithm and the key length associated
with the algorithm, therefore he systematically tries all the possible keys of
that length;
2. the attacker knows the encryption algorithm but does not know the key
length associated with it, thus he systematically tries all the possible keys
for a given set of key lengths.
Case 1 represents the worst case for the defendant, as the attacker has the deepest
knowledge about the adopted cryptosystem. Case 2 will be referred to as the inter-
mediate case in the following discussion. The best case for security is represented
by an attacker who does not know anything about the adopted cryptosystems,
and therefore tries all the possible keys for a given set of key lengths and a given
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set of cryptosystems. In the following we do not discuss this case explicitly, as it
can be considered as a generalization of the intermediate case.
The time to complete a brute force attack clearly depends on many factors, in-
cluding the cryptographic algorithm, the key space, and the attacker’s elaboration
resources. Commonly adopted cryptosystems use large keys, and require a huge
computational effort to be broken with a brute force attack, especially when the
attacker is not provided with a complex computational infrastructure.
We evaluated our approach with respect to the security layer configurations de-
scribed in Chapter 4. The features of the considered cryptosystems are summarized
in Table 5.1. The WM ECC sk and WM ECC rc5 cryptosystems are both based
on the WM-ECC library, used to execute key exchange and digital signature op-
erations. They both perform symmetric encryption using respectively a Skipjack
cipher with a 80 bit key and an RC5 cipher with a key of 160 bits. The TinyPairing
cryptosystems is based on TinyPairing and uses a 208 bit key. In Table 5.1, the
time needed to test a single key is reported for each cryptosystem, along with the
maximum attack time, that is the time necessary to test all the possible keys.
The reported elaboration time refers to the execution of the decryption operation
on TelosB devices, characterized by a 4.15 MHz MSP430 microcontroller and a
CC2420 radio chip and having a 10 kB internal RAM and a 48 kB program Flash
memory.
It is important to point out that, due to the computational complexity of attacks,
we will refer to simple attack scenarios where an attacker is able to gather partial
information on the adopted cryptosystem but it does not have enough computa-
tional capabilities. As a consequence of these assumptions, in our experimental
results, the resulting attack time will be significantly high but this will not affect
the validity of the proposed approach as we are interested in illustrating how the
probability of successfully completing an attack decreases.
We carried out our simulation experiments considering both worst and interme-
diate cases, and analyzed the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the attack
time. In both cases, we simulated an attacker sequentially exploring the key space.
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Cryptosystem key len (bits) time(ms) max attack time(ms)
WM ECC sk 80 0.001251 1,5123E+21
WM ECC rc5 160 0.001221 1,7845E+45
TinyPairing 208 13.019531 5,3560E+63
Table 5.1: Characteristics of the cryptosystems used in the experiments
We considered an observation interval as long as the attack time of the most com-
plex cryptosystem, TinyPairing, and validity intervals of decreasing length. During
an observation interval, we randomly generated 1000 different sequences of valid
cryptosystems and recorded the time of successful attacks. The sequence length
depends on the chosen validity interval.
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Figure 5.4: Worst case attack time cdf for large validity intervals
Figure 5.4 shows the attack time’s cdf in the worst case; we chose three validity
interval lengths in such a way to be comparable to the maximum attack times of the
three different cryptosystems. The labels in the figure – note that the x-axis is on
a logarithmic scale – identify three inflection points in the middle of the maximum
attack times of each cryptosystem. These correspond to the maximum values of
the attack time probability distribution functions (pdf) for each cryptosystem.
When analyzing the chart, a seemingly counterintuitive behavior can be identified:
when considering smaller validity intervals the attacker seems to benefit. This is
due to the fact that – in the considered scenario – when randomly choosing 1000
different cryptosystem sequences, the weakest cryptosystem WM ECC sk will be
selected with 33% probability; in this case, considering the attack times reported
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in Table 5.1, the attacker will always succeed for validity intervals longer than
1,5123E+21 milliseconds (worst case for WM ECC sk).
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Figure 5.5: Worst case attack time cdf for short validity intervals
As illustrated in Figure 5.5, when further reducing the validity interval below the
maximum attack time of the weakest cryptosystem, the trend changes and the
attack time becomes higher, with the percentage of successful attacks reducing
dramatically. The same behaviour is highlighted in Figure 5.6, that shows how
the probability of completing a successful attack in a time t – with t equal to
5.36e+19, 1.34e+21, 2.68e+21 and 5.35e+45 milliseconds respectively – varies as
the length of the validity interval changes: as soon as the validity interval goes
below the maximum attack time of the weakest cryptosystem, the rate at which
probability decreases becomes higher.
It is sufficient to consider validity intervals reasonably smaller than this critical
value (threshold) to ensure both a low attack probability and a limited reconfigu-
ration overhead. Due to the proposed attack model, the identified thresholds are
significantly high but, as said, this does not affect the validity of the approach.
Analogous results can be obtained when reconfiguration is performed by select-
ing an equivalent cryptosystem that uses different parameters (i.e different keys).
Figure 5.7 (a) shows the attack time cdf in the worst case when reconfiguration
is performed by switching among three cryptosystems that implement the WM-
ECC library with the Skipjack cipher, but have different keys. As shown, when
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Figure 5.6: Probability of successful attack vs. length of validity interval
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Figure 5.7: Worst case attack time cdf when (a) using the same cryptosystem with
different keys - (b) using three different cryptosystems
reducing the validity interval, the probability of successfully complete an attack
sensitively reduces as the intrinsic security level is restored each time a new key
is activated. For comparison purposes, in Figure 5.7 (b) the attack time cdf of
Figure 5.5 is reported; as expected, having more complex cryptosystems helps to
achieve a lower probability of attack.
The worst case is very unlikely to occur. A more realistic assumption is that the
attacker knows or is able to infer which kind of cryptosystem is currently used, but
it does not know the key length associated with it. We assume that the attacker
systematically tries all the possible keys for a given set of key lengths. Figure 5.8
compares the attack time cdf for the intermediate and the worst cases, under the
assumption that the attacker performs a brute force attack using the set of key
lengths in Table 5.2. As illustrated with respect to a validity interval of 5,36E+45
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Cryptosystem key len (bits) time(ms)
WM ECC sk [80] [0.001251]
WM ECC rc5 [120,160] [0.001120,0.001221]
TinyPairing [180,208] [11.023211,13.019531]
Table 5.2: Key lengths set
milliseconds, that is long enough to allow the attacker to break both WM ECC sk
and WM ECC rc5 , the attacker’s success probability is smaller in the intermediate
case than in the worst case. Clearly, when the attacker’s uncertainty about the
used cryptosystem is higher, more key lengths will be tested, making the proposed
approach even more effective.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and future directions
In this thesis we addressed monitoring architectures composed of resource-constrained
devices and developed a Moving Target Defense-inspired framework, based on re-
configuration at different granularity levels, to ensure security, performance and
consumption requirements.
We formalized our reconfiguration approach by providing a reconfiguration model,
identifying the reconfigurable parameters for a generic embedded node, a recon-
figuration strategy for the selection of the new configuration to activate based on
input requirements, and two different reconfiguration mechanisms referred to a
WSN case study.
In order to define the reconfiguration strategy, we introduced a security metric
based on attack coverage, able to measure the level of security provided by each
configuration. Such metric, along with the commonly adopted performance and
power consumption metrics, is used by the reconfiguration strategy to select the
configuration that best meets the current quality requirements.
We developed a WSN case study to show the feasibility of the reconfiguration ap-
proach on real architectures and conducted theoretical and experimental analyses
to prove its effectiveness in decreasing the probability of attack.
Although many interesting activities have been conducted with respect to the
above discussed topics, several issues are still open and need to be investigated.
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Our future plans include the design of a fully-automated reconfiguration strat-
egy capable of identifying the system configuration that can best meet specific,
dynamically changing requirements in terms of security, performance and power
consumption. In order to do this, an innovative security metric for the compari-
son of different configurations must be defined; the most challenging aspect is the
identification and modeling of the dependency relations existing between security
and time, that constitutes a relevant and still unexplored topic.
We also plan to perform a deep evaluation of the optimal reconfiguration frequency
and to introduce automatic mechanisms to map the existing requirements onto the
available configurations (technological mapping).
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